Card Sense in Online Draw

I had been on hold for 15 minutes with the tech support department of a large computer security software company, because my firewall and virus detection software were acting up, and the repetition every two minutes of a message that never changed, "Due to the volume of calls, your wait time may be eight to 10 minutes," told me I could easily be in the queue for another half-hour.

I joined an online draw poker game. I didn't want to get involved in heavy action and then get distracted by needing to devote my attention to a support person, so I jumped into the smallest game, $1-$2. During my half-hour on hold, I made about $30, so my time wasn't wasted. This is called multitasking.

Poker is a game of situations, position, and opportunity. Top players take advantage of them to increase their winnings, but you low rollers can do it, too. If you play only "according to the book," you'll miss out on some of these moneymaking opportunities. They are part of what I call card sense, defined in The Official Dictionary of Poker as follows: "In a poker game, it's an acute awareness of the totality of what is going on, not narrowing your focus to just what's happening in your own hand. Card sense implies the ability to act on your observations, and to think on your feet. You must have imagination in playing your own hand, and almost X-ray vision in being able to reconstruct opponents' hands. It is card sense that causes a player to play the same cards differently in different situations. A player without card sense usually plays the same cards the same way in all situations." Yeah, you ask, but does that work online, too? Sure. Why not? The three factors of the first sentence come into play frequently. You may not be able to pick up observational tells on players, but you can often figure out what they're doing based on playing patterns.

I used card sense to make a play based on reasoning, and took advantage of an opportunity to turn a sure loser into a winner – all without having to show the best hand, or show any hand, as it turned out.

The game was fivehanded. The player to my left, YerNext, seemed solid. At least, when the pressure was on, he had good hands. If he played in a raised pot, he had at least a big pair. He seemed aggressive, and I had not seen him play substandard hands.

The player to my right, icallallbets, was what I would classify weak-tight. That is, he was not aggressive and usually called rather than raised.

The player to the right of icallallbets was the one on whom my interest fell. CallThis2 seemed live. This impression strengthened as I played.

I waited for the big blind to get dealt in. CallThis2 raised from the button and icallallbets called. I had no pair and could not participate. Icallallbets drew one card and CallThis2 drew two. Icallallbets checked and CallThis2 quickly bet. Icallallbets called. CallThis2 showed his hand, 4 4 A K J. It was safe to say that icallallbets would show a better hand than that, and, of course, he did, 10 10 7 7 9.

This told me something about both players. Icallallbets was typical of lots of online draw players. He would call but rarely reraise before the draw with two pair, and would check and call after the draw. By interpolation, if Icallallbets reraised before the draw when someone raise-opened, he had to have aces up or better – and most likely better.

I initially pegged CallThis2 as a bluffer, but I'm always careful about snap assessments. He easily could have been making a one-time play.

The next hand, MsDMeaner, the fifth player in this game, sitting to the left of YerNext, who now had the big blind, limped in for $1. CallThis2 immediately raised. Icallallbets folded. I had a pair of nines in the small blind, not a hand to call with in a raised pot. YerNext came in for the additional bet, and MsDMeaner called. They all drew three cards. YerNext and MsDMeaner both checked. CallThis2 immediately bet. YerNext folded and MsDMeaner called. CallThis2 showed an unimproved pair of nines, and MsDMeaner showed two pair, kings and jacks. This implied that MsDMeaner was also weak-tight, or maybe she just knew that CallThis2 would bet when checked to.

Next, I was on the button. CallThis2 opened from under the gun for a raise. Icallallbets reraised. I, YerNext, and MsDMeaner folded. CallThis2 just called, which somewhat surprised me. CallThis2 drew one card and icallallbets drew two. CallThis2 bet and icallallbets called. CallThis2 showed a missed straight, which did not surprise me. Icallallbets showed three fours.

I had seen enough to tell me how CallThis2 played. I described such a player a few columns back in "Online Draw With a Maniac." Now, I needed to wait for an opportunity to play a pot with him.

That opportunity did not come up for a few rounds. Whenever he came in for a raise, I did not have a playable hand. Or, if I had a hand that had a reasonable chance of being better than his, either someone came in for a raise and he reraised, or he opened for a raise and icallallbets reraised. A few of the hands that CallThis2 played, he actually started with legitimate cards, or made a winning hand, and he still had plenty of chips when the following hand came up.

At each juncture in the play of this hand, conditions changed, and probabilities changed with them. This is where the card sense came in, because I had to constantly reassess what was happening and how best to react to the change.

Icallallbets had the button; I was in the small blind. MsDMeaner folded. CallThis2 opened for a raise. Although he had already run two or three bluffs in a row, I didn't have to worry that the likelihood of a bluff had suddenly gotten extremely low. That is, some players quit bluffing for a while after they get caught, but not CallThis2. He could, of course, have a "real" hand. Icallallbets folded. Had he called, I would have played my hand differently.

My hand was Q Q A 9 8. My hand was a strong favorite over the range of hands CallThis2 would play. He would, of course, play any hand better than mine. He would also play any pair, any come hand (four to a flush or straight, including an inside straight), any cathop (three cards to a straight flush), and many other three-card combinations that were considerably worse than a pair of queens. I reraised. My plan was to draw three cards. If CallThis2 drew two cards, I knew that many of the hands he would play that way would consist of one pair with an ace kicker. My throwing an ace made it less likely for him to hit the kicker. If I did not improve my one pair, I would check and call – because he would almost certainly bet when I checked. I would probably also check and call with queens up, but I would bet three queens, hoping that he would raise so I could reraise. I had seen him raise after the draw on several occasions with two pair. If CallThis2 capped the betting before the draw, I of course would call.

Oops! YerNext capped the betting from the big blind. CallThis2 called two more bets. I had to reassess the situation. At this point, there were 11 bets in the pot. I was certain YerNext had my hand beat, but unless he had three kings or better, it was not worse than 11-to-1 against my making the best hand.

I called and drew three cards. It did not occur to me to keep the ace as a kicker. I figured I needed trips to win, and didn't want to lose more money by making aces up. Figuring I was behind, I wanted the best chance to improve.

YerNext totally surprised me by also drawing three. It was time to reassess again. He had to have aces. Unless I had read him completely wrong, he was not a maniac. Having seen me not play many hands thus far, he must have put me on some kind of hand and not have suddenly decided this was the point to make an out-of-character play. And he must surely realize that if he was bluffing, I might not call him, but CallThis2 would. All of this pointed to aces. But why had he capped with the hand? I thought it was because he realized that, having observed the way CallThis2 played, I might raise CallThis2 with a marginal hand. Thus, his aces might very well be the best hand at that point, and worth a reraise – if only to take the play away from me. Also, even if he didn't have me beat, given CallThis2's proclivities, he likely was second, and had implied odds for improvement. He had position over me, and could see how I drew and what I did after the draw. But I very much liked his drawing three cards, even though I knew he had me beat, because I now had a better chance of improving than he, given that I had discarded one of the two remaining aces.

CallThis2 drew two cards. This further lessened YerNext's chances, because CallThis2 often pushed a pair with an ace kicker.

I did not improve, and pretty much gave up on the pot at that point. It did not occur to me to bet, because YerNext might improve, YerNext might call unimproved, and YerNext might just call even with improvement, hoping that CallThis2 would raise, thus trapping me. And CallThis2 could improve or have had the best hand all along. He would raise in those situations, costing me. I checked, and if YerNext bet, I was definitely through.

YerNext checked. I was certain this meant he had not improved. I didn't think he would check an improvement here. If he improved, he would be looking for a call from CallThis2 – who had on a few occasions just called with substandard hands rather than raise – or a raise that could be reraised, and he might get a call from me.

Not unexpectedly, CallThis2 bet as soon as checked to. On other occasions, a quick bet in turn had meant no improvement (and he had hesitated slightly when he had a real hand). Again, I rethought the situation. Could I win this pot? There was a reasonable chance that CallThis2 could not beat my two queens. But I could not simply call, because then YerNext would overcall with one pair of aces, thinking I might be calling CallThis2 for a bluff. If YerNext was capable of capping the bet with one pair, thinking the hand might be the best, he certainly would be capable of overcalling if I called.

Should I fold? The pot currently held 14 small bets. I thought it worth making a play for. If I was right about CallThis2, I had him beat. I was willing to take a chance. I check-raised.

This put the pressure on YerNext. Sure, I knew there was a good chance he held the best hand, but he didn't know that. I had played my hand exactly the way he would expect someone who had made trips to play: check, knowing that if the three-card capper didn't bet, the two-card habitual bluffer surely would. If YerNext called two big bets cold, CallThis2 might reraise. If I really had trips, I would cap, and he would either have to give up those two bets or likely lose four. YerNext folded.

I was prepared for CallThis2 to reraise my bet. I had seen him go three bets after the draw on two previous occasions with missed hands, so if he reraised, I would call. I had also seen him fold when he bluffed on the end and was raised. CallThis2 evidently figured he had gotten caught too many times, and folded. I was very pleased. I had won 14 small bets with the second-best hand by using card sense. And I had had to change my assessment of the situation at every step.

Finally, tech support interrupted the recorded loop to offer help with my software problem, and I had to give up the game.

Michael Wiesenberg's The Official Dictionary of Poker is recognized as the ultimate authority on the language of cardrooms. You can order it from the Card Player Bookstore or online at CardPlayer.com.