The Best Defense

My starting hand with three players remaining at the final table of a big online pot-limit Omaha high-low tournament was 8-6-4-2. It was my $8,000 big blind, and the chips were relatively equally divided (I had about $150,000 and the other two players each had about $100,000 plus). The very aggressive button raised before the flop, making it $20,000 to go. The small blind ($4,000) folded and I made the marginal call, because this opponent had been raising every time it was his turn. When heads up, four low cards without an ace is a below-average hand. But if the preflop raiser usually pushes after any flop, four low cards with a good flop might scoop up a big swing.



The flop came A K 5. What would you do here with my cards? Since I had been playing fairly sound poker throughout, I probably had a tightish image.



This was one of those situations in which I knew that if I checked, my opponent would make a fairly big bet. If I had had a really great hand, I simply would have checked and let him bet, and then either raised or called and trapped. However, I had merely a decent low draw, which was probably good enough to keep me in the pot – but nothing to write home about. So, what was my objective? To keep the betting low? To see another card? Or, should I make a move?



It was unlikely that he had flopped a flush, but maybe he would think I had a flush if I made a big bet. I certainly wouldn't be sad if he folded. My only high prospect at the moment was an inside straight, but my low prospects were very good because of the ace in the flop. But since a low will not be made on this type of hand more than one-fourth of the time, it did occur to me that one of my objectives might well be to try to see the next two cards as cheaply as possible.



But if I checked, he probably would bet $20,000 or more, and then momentum might well get him all in on the turn. So, if I decided to "quietly defend" this hand, hoping to at least get my money back with a low, it was quite possible that I would have to put $100,000 plus into the pot to see the last card.



If my estimate of his probable aggressiveness was correct, I had nothing to lose by making a big move here. It might even turn out that if I bet the pot now and then checked the turn, he also might check (absent his own momentum), since he would not expect me to fold at that point. Thus, I might end up saving some money if I lost the pot.



Experience has taught me that when I look back at most of these "momentum situations," it usually turns out that it would have been tactically correct to take the initiative. They say that the best defense is a good offense. Whenever an opponent does not have a good hand, an appropriate-size bet either makes him fold or presents him with a problem and a chance to make a mistake.



So, I bet $40,000. There was a long pause, which was unusual for this particular opponent, who usually responded lightning fast. He finally just called. Since I couldn't see him, it was not clear whether he was thinking about raising or folding.



The turn card was a very interesting 7. Not only did I complete my second-nut low (2-3 was the nut low), but I now had 17 outs to make a straight (four threes, three fours, three sixes, three eights, and four nines). What would you do now?



All in all, I thought it was crystal clear to go all in. Again, I would have been happy if he folded, since I had no high. But if he called and I didn't make a high, I probably would win low and get my money back. It is advantageous to be in a situation in which you might win the whole pot by betting aggressively, but if called, will probably win at least half the pot. So, once again, the aggressive approach did seem to have the most going for it.



However, my opponent's actual hand was A-2-5-K (he really had a preflop raising hand this time). Since he had aces and fives and a low draw (he didn't know I had low locked up at this point), he chose to call all in. Note that any one of my 17 straight cards on the river would have knocked him out. But, he ended up splitting the pot with me.



The concept here occurs frequently, especially in two-way games. If you have a borderline hand (for example, a medium pair in hold'em) and decide that you probably would "call down" the preflop raiser, you might instead try taking the initiative by betting. In a situation in which one of two mediocre hands might be folded, it's best that it be your opponent's. Taking the offensive not only increases your chances of winning the pot, but in many scenarios results in your losing less.