Is It Good Unimproved?

We were several hours into our $40-$80 limit hold'em game at The Venetian. A local pro player limped in from in front of me and I looked down to see the A K. I was faced with two options: limping in with the intent of trapping players yet to act and possibly reraising a raiser who could add significant betting volume and edge to my hand, or raising with the intent of eliminating players and/or adding volume value to the hand.

Inasmuch as all close decisions in poker are conditional, I thought about the current situation.

The big blind was a player who liked calling raises from the blind and was unlikely to fold. That point made the case for trapping by limping, as the extra value of raising and folding the big blind would be unlikely.

I thought about my image at the table. I had not played a hand for a while and my opponents yet to act were not likely to be in the mood to shoot it up with me. That thought made the likelihood of a raise behind me lower than average. That concept spoke to raising, as I would be less likely to be able to reraise a raiser behind me and pick up value that way.

I also thought about the style of my opponent who had called in front of me. His limping in from up front made me think his hand might possess an ace or a king, a hand I would dominate. Plus, he was a player I had good control over, and I could likely outplay him in the hand. Those concepts spoke to raising to eliminate opponents behind me in order to play my possibly dominating hand over one opponent.

When faced with deciding the correct play in a situation in which there are competing viable choices, the applicable poker concepts are often not congruent with each other. In such cases, you must weigh the value of all of the applicable concepts and determine the right play. In this case, I chose to isolate by raising the pot, mostly because I thought the value of aggression against the initial caller was high.

Although I probably wouldn't fold the big blind, there was some chance that I might move out players behind me and effectively "buy the button" with my raise, giving me the privilege of last action on all future streets. The isolation play did not work, as two players called behind me and the big blind also called. That said, the raise play was not a total failure. I had four opponents in for two bets with A-K suited, which was not a bad spot at all.

When comparing play alternatives, one should weigh the value of the play in all plausible scenarios and incorporate the likelihood of the scenario into the equation in addition to the value. If one play, even if unlikely, has high positive or negative value, that scenario can affect the value of the play hugely, especially if the pot is large.

The flop came down 9-8-6 with two spades, a favorable flop for my hand. The big blind bet and the pro player who had limped in from under the gun in front of me folded. Once again, I was faced with two alternative choices: limp in and trap players behind me to add value to my hand if I made the flush, or raise for value and possibly protect a one-pair hand I might make. The players behind me did not have loose playing styles. A raise would eliminate some of the hands with which they might call: overcards, gutshots, and possibly small or medium pairs.

I thought about what my betting opponent might hold. He was the type of player to lead with any draw. This flop contained several draws, particularly since he had entered the pot from the big blind and his range of plausible hands was large. Raising would have large value to me if I eliminated a hand that might beat me, and very large value if my opponent who led from the big blind held a draw and my A-K was the best hand. I chose to raise. If I got called behind me, so be it, as the play couldn't have significant negative value even in a worst-case scenario (such as a set being out behind me).

To my delight, the two players behind me folded, the bettor called, and I took the turn heads up against the big blind. The turn card was the 2. I chose to bet again. If the river was a blank, I was calling anyway with ace high, as this player would put me on overcards and bluff the river. While I understand that I put myself in a position to get check-raised, a scenario that would create negative value for myself, I could also gain value if I made a hand on the river, bet again, and got called by an inferior hand. There also was a slight chance that he could fold a hand that would end up beating me, a scenario creating huge value for myself. Weighing the plausible scenarios dictated that betting was a better play.

The river was the 4, missing my hand completely. My opponent checked and I checked behind him, believing he was not the type of player who would fold a pair on the river to a single bet when heads up. Therefore, betting had no value, as he would call me if I was beat and fold if he held a draw and my hand was superior.

"One pair," he stated.

"That's good," I responded.

He turned over the Q 4, having made a pair of fours on the river after missing his spade draw to which he was drawing dead. I smiled weakly inside myself as I tossed my hand into the muck. The scenario was the perfect one for my play. I had isolated not only a draw, but a dead flush draw. His only win was to pair and have me miss pairing. Of course, that is all immaterial now, as the poker gods chose to keep me humble - which is not always the easiest of tasks, some might say.

This hand speaks to the concept of incorporating the possibility of your hand being good into the poker equation. In large pots, even a small chance that your hand is good and also may improve to win the pot can add significant value to the equation.

This is a concept that arises often with small and medium pairs. Many players are far too loose by calling preflop raisers with these pairs, especially a tight raiser. Having done so, they often find themselves in two- and three-way pots that are tough situations to read, hoping and praying that the raiser holds two high cards that didn't hit, rather than a higher pair that crushes them. And therefore they pay off weakly to the end, putting their opponents on a hand they can beat. Some value is derived from this, when their hands are good and can in fact win unimproved. But overall, overplaying small pairs in this way has you putting in loads of chips when you are beat, with little chance to beat the superior hand, and unable to maximize your winnings when your hand is good. Yet, you see small and medium pairs played this way every day.

In any case, when there is a chance to win unimproved, whether with a good ace or a pair, factor it into your decisions. But don't put yourself in the position of depending on that way to win more often than the situation dictates.

Roy Cooke has played winning professional poker since 1972. He is a successful real estate broker/salesperson in Las Vegas. His books are available at www.conjelco.com/cooke. His longtime collaborator, John Bond, is a freelance writer in South Florida.