Reading Another Player's Reads

Players frequently struggle when trying to read hands. I agree that piecing together the clues regarding player tendencies, betting patterns, and so on can be difficult. Recently, though, I played a hand in which I thought I had a perfect read on my opponents' cards, and still was unsure of what to do. What I had to figure out was whether one of my opponents had the same read that I did.

I held the K Q in the cutoff in a $60-$120 game. A young, up-and-coming pro ("Charlie") limped in from early position. Charlie was fairly new on the scene, mostly because he is just 21 years old. He was a conservative player who seemed to be mostly a grinder. Charlie open-limped occasionally from early position, which I don't think is correct very often, as you know. Everyone folded to me, and I raised to put pressure on the blinds and take control of the hand post-flop. An excellent player in the big blind ("Pat") called, and Charlie reraised.



This limp-reraise from a conservative player was totally unexpected. Charlie and I had spent more than 30 hours in the same games, and he had never made this play. When most players limp-reraise preflop from early position, they usually have a premium pair, typically aces. Since I held both a king and a queen, aces were even more likely. Unless something happened to change my mind, I was putting Charlie on this hand.



Should I have called or folded? Usually, voluntarily playing against aces with marginal undercards is not a great gamble, but I was getting 8.66-1 in the highly likely event that Pat called, as well, and I was presumably playing against a faceup hand. Even though I knew I was way behind, I was now getting a price to see the flop. Of course, had Charlie open-raised, I would have folded, but you need to take circumstances as they are. I called, as did Pat, and the flop came J 7 3. I had a king-high flush draw and little else.



Surprisingly, Pat bet out immediately. What could this bet mean? We need to start by figuring that Pat, who is one of the best limit hold'em players I know at Bellagio, also assumed Charlie probably held aces. He hardly would have led with a hand he knew was beat, so he must have been able to beat aces.



What does that mean he had? The board was too disjointed for him to have two pair, so he presumably had a set or a flush. Couldn't he have had a hand like the A J, or some similar nut-flush draw? If he did, he would have checked, hoping Charlie bet and I called, so that he could get three-way action. By betting, he was risking Charlie raising and me folding, which would reduce his current price from 2-1 to even money. It was still possible, but I discounted the nut-flush draw, as most players wait for later streets, when they hit the nuts.



Charlie raised. I was not sure that Charlie understood how well Pat played, and how transparent his preflop play was, but I believed at this point that my second-nut draw merited a (nervous) call. In retrospect, this might not have been a bad time to let go of my hand, but even though I had decent reads on likely hands, I thought the situation was too fluid for me to fold the second-nut draw. If Charlie indeed held aces, there was a 50 percent chance that he held the A, but even though I was putting him on aces, I was not certain that his limp-reraise meant that exact hand.



Not surprisingly, Pat three-bet. This tilted the scales toward a flush, since I had called, and Pat had to know that I knew about Charlie's aces, so I must have a big heart or better, or a set myself. I suspect with a set that he would have waited for the turn, checking and calling if a heart fell, and check-raising Charlie (and me) if a blank hit. This is how I would have played a set, trying to extract maximum value if the turn was favorable, forcing my opponents to call a double big bet for a single draw rather than an additional small bet for draws on the turn and the river.



Charlie and I called. Indeed, a blank hit the turn and Pat bet out. Charlie called. Now, I had a somewhat unusual problem. I "knew" what Pat had (almost certainly a flush), and I thought he had made that very clear. And I "knew" Charlie almost certainly held aces, since he called Pat's raise and turn bet without a flicker. But the question was, did Charlie know what Pat had?



The chance that Charlie held the A, assuming he had aces, was 50 percent. He should have realized by now that if he did not hold the A, he was drawing dead and should fold. But, did he actually understand what was happening? If he did, he must have the A and I was drawing dead. If he did not, I had a 50-50 chance to have the best draw.



By that time, the pot held 11 big bets. Since Pat had a flush, I had seven hearts to make my hand 50 percent of the time only if Charlie would call here with any two aces. That's an average of three and a half outs for 43 unknown cards (I knew my hand, the board, Pat's two hearts, and one of Charlie's aces). So, I was getting the right price (around 11.25-1 plus possible extra calls on the river) if Charlie was not reading this situation correctly. Unfortunately, I was drawing dead if he was.



Arguing for a call, ironically, was the chance that I had misread the situation entirely and they each held different hands. For example, if Pat had a set or a pair of queens, and Charlie was making a weird play of some sort, I really had at least eight outs. On the negative side, there had to be some chance that Pat was playing the nut flush strongly from the get-go. Charlie was a pro, and if there was even a 25 percent chance that he knew what he was doing, I was not close to getting the right price to continue. I folded, in spite of the large pot.



As it turned out, the river was a heart and Pat won with his 10-high flush, as Charlie's aces did not include the A. I was surprised that a pro like him would have either misread or not bothered to read the hands and situation, but my misread of Charlie's read cost me a pot. Perhaps I should have realized he was unclear about the situation when he raised on the flop.



Conclusion: I thought this was a very interesting hand. I had a very good read on my opponents' hands fairly early, but my decision came down to my read of Charlie's read.



Despite the fact that I was wrong, and the key card fell on the river, I think I made the right decision on the turn.



Clearly, reading other players' reads on other opponents is something I need to work on. It does not arise as a key decision point very often, but it still has the potential to help me to make better decisions more often.



I have noticed that a key difference between pros and amateurs is the pros' willingness to analyze hands, look for flaws in their game, and resolve to work on them. I hope by sharing this hand with you, I can encourage you to look at your play, find areas that need work, and figure out ways to improve them.



Barry offers poker lessons tailored to the specific strengths and weaknesses of the individual student. Please visit his web site at www.barrytanenbaum.com or e-mail him at [email protected].