Sometimes you get two challenges in the same hand: Does the aggressive play of an opponent indicate a hand that beats yours, and if so, does he indeed hold it or is he trying to buy the pot? Recently, I played a hand that had both of these aspects.
Background: Hands rarely stand by themselves in a vacuum, and this one is no exception. The player on my right, a pleasant fellow and occasional Las Vegas visitor from Australia, was an OK player with a tendency to raise quite a bit too loosely. I tend to punish guys like that with a blistering variety of three-bets, especially when I am in late position, and this evening was no exception. I must have already three-bet him preflop five times or more in about three hours, winning almost all of them (mostly when no one else called, and he folded on the flop).
A consequence of my aggressive play is the impact it has on the players to my left. These guys are usually in the blinds or on the button when I three-bet, and they soon tire of abandoning their hands over and over. They realize from my three-betting frequency that I do not always hold true premium hands, but three bets is a lot to call with a modest holding, hoping that the raiser is weak, that I am weak for my play, and that they make a winning hand. They tend to fold and seethe, waiting for the moment that their hand is good enough to punish me for what they see as my overly aggressive play.
The hand: On this hand, Mr. Down Under raised from two off the button, and I of course three-bet from the cutoff with my A
K
. I had been making this play with a wide variety of hands, and was pleased to see that I finally had something actually worth a three-bet. The button and small blind folded, but the big blind looked annoyed, mumbled to his neighbor something like, "There he goes again," and called, as did the raiser.
The flop was 10
8
3
, and both players checked to me. My general rule with A-K when I totally miss the flop is to bet against one or two players and check against three or more. I couldn't see any reason to vary my play here, so I bet.
The big blind check-raised, and the other guy folded. I called to await developments. These developments could include cards that helped me, cards that hurt me, and cards that did not seem to matter. I do this assessment constantly during a hand, trying to determine how I will proceed if various events happen, and to determine roughly how many possible good cards may hit compared to the possible bad ones.
Before I continue, please take a look and think about what the worst possible card for me would be on the turn, given the action so far.
Done? OK, if you said a 9, you are correct. Yes, there are other bad cards, but a 9 is clearly the worst. Let's see why.
Assuming that the check-raise on the flop was not made on air, my opponent in the big blind rates to have either a pair or a draw. If he has a pair, he is ahead already. Let's look at his possible draws. If he is open-ended, he has J-9 or 9-7. If he has a gutshot, he has Q-J, Q-9, J-7, 9-6, or 7-6. Not all of these are equally likely, of course, but that's the list. The common quality of all of these holdings is that a 9 gives him a better hand than mine, even if by accident (meaning he did not make the hand he was hoping to make).
OK, the turn was a 9, and he bet out. I seriously considered folding because the 9 was so bad, but his preflop mumble resounded in my head. If he thought I was making one of my many moves (as he saw it), he would play this way with far more hands than normal. He might even have been determined to take this one away no matter what he held. The chances that he was on a pure bluff or betting a hand like A-K, A-Q, or A-J because he thought it rated to be the best hand were much greater than usual. The pot held eight-and-a-half big bets, I might have anywhere from six to zero outs, and there was a chance that I had the best hand.
I frequently judge my actions by where my hand is compared to the range of hands I could hold for my play. In this case, I was on the high end of my three-bet scale, as I would have three-bet this particular raiser with hands as bad as 10-8 suited or Q-9 offsuit. The fact that I was on the top of my range was important, but it did not matter if I was definitely beat.
But I could not get away from his preflop comment. It just stuck with me. The implication that he was aware of my high steal rate and determined to do something about it meant that he would bluff out of frustration more often than he otherwise might. I decided to call the turn, and probably the river, as well.
The river was a blank, and he dutifully bet again. My general rule here is that if I am going to call with A-K high, I prefer to raise, in case he is bluffing with a small pair or other mediocre holding that beats mine (even if he thinks he is bluffing). In this case, I believed that because of my aggressive image, he was skeptical and would not have honored any raise I made. So, I just called.
Conclusion: Since this hand is appearing here, you probably assume that I won. OK, I did! He showed down A-J.
I could just as easily have lost, of course, as he could have had A-10 or anything else. The successful call was very good for my credibility for the rest of the session, though.
Let me leave you with two thoughts. First, had he played without comment, he certainly would have won. He gave me a reason to be suspicious and then made a suspicious play. Do not tell your neighbors what you are thinking, especially during a hand.
Second, I hope you were able to do the exercise to know what the most dangerous turn card was for that flop. You always should think about that as you plan your play. And, of course, you always should plan your play.
Barry offers poker lessons tailored to the specific strengths and weaknesses of the individual student. Please visit his web site at www.barrytanenbaum.com or e-mail him at [email protected].
