Back to Bluffing

Recently, I think I've spent too much time away from my favorite subject of bluffing. So, let me recount a bluff I pulled off not long ago, and explain the thought processes that went along with it.







It was a no-limit hold'em game with $1-$2 blinds, and I was in the small blind. After a couple of players folded, "Mort" opened for $8. He's a somewhat solid, straightforward player, but he doesn't need a premium hand to open-raise. Two players called behind him, I called with the 8 7, and the big blind called. Mort and I both had around $300 in our stacks, while the other players had somewhere between $100 and $200.



Five-handed, the flop came J 6 4. I had a gutshot draw to the nuts and a backdoor-flush draw, but it wasn't the flop I had been hoping for. I checked. The big blind, who seemed to be a relative novice, made a weak $10 bet into the $40 pot. Mort called instantly. The other two players folded, and the action was back to me.



Originally, I had expected to check and fold, but my opponents' actions gave me some good information. The novice didn't appear capable of trickery, and his bets were usually consistent with the strength of his hand. His $10 bet signaled one pair, possibly jacks with a weak kicker, and perhaps not even jacks. Meanwhile, Mort called without giving any thought to raising, which essentially eliminated the possibility of top pair or an overpair. With either of those, he at least would have considered a raise. His quick call meant that he had either a monster hand, such as a set, or something much weaker, such as two overcards or a pair smaller than jacks. Since it's not that easy to flop a set, it was much more likely that his hand was on the weak side.



Given all of this, I definitely considered check-raising on the flop and trying to win the pot right there. Besides being the simplest course of action, there was a decent chance that it would work. But something was nagging at me in the back of my mind. I was wondering why Mort, who also should have read the novice's bet as weak, didn't raise no matter what he held. Was he being tricky? Or, did he simply act before thinking? I wanted to believe that he just made a mistake, and that I'd be able to take him off his hand, but, truthfully, I wasn't entirely sure.



With that in mind, I decided just to call the $10, with the intention of check-raising the turn if another weak bet was made. It was a calculated risk. I didn't know for sure that anyone would bet, and I was giving them the chance to catch a helpful card. On the other hand, I felt the most important thing was to make sure that I was reading them correctly – that they were as weak as I thought – and letting them act on their hands a second time would accomplish that. I was increasing the likelihood of reading their strength correctly, and assuming the turn was a relatively harmless card, I was also increasing my chances of running a successful bluff. Especially in no-limit hold'em, when the amount I'd be risking on that bluff would be close to the size of the pot, I wanted to make extra sure that I was reading the situation correctly.



The turn was the 4, pairing the bottom card on the flop. Other than hitting my gutshot, it was really one of the best cards I could have hoped for. I checked, the novice player checked, and Mort immediately grabbed a stack of chips. He took a second to decide how much to bet, and then came out with $50. When that happened, I felt that I could almost read Mort's mind. It was as if he said to himself, "Damn, I should have raised on the flop. I probably would have won uncontested. Let me make up for it now by making a strong turn bet. Nobody should be able to call." Furthermore, his quick grab at his chips eased any worries I had about being up against a monster. With an unbeatable hand, he almost certainly would have made some sort of attempt at feigning weakness.



I paused briefly, then started cutting out a raise to $125. The novice player mucked instantly, and before I could even finish putting my chips in the pot, Mort had mucked, as well. It was a doubly satisfying result. Not only did I win the pot, but their quick folds showed that I had picked an excellent time to bluff. Besides having read them correctly as being weak, I was also able to represent strength, to the point where neither of them even considered the possibility that I was bluffing, or that they might have the best hand. As a bluffer, that's when you know that you've done well. The icing on the cake was that by waiting until the turn to raise, I picked up an extra $50.



In general, bluffing from out of position is a risky proposition, and it's not something that I try to do often. But sometimes a situation presents itself, and you can't just ignore it. Upon seeing the flop, I was expecting to check and fold, since I wasn't going to try to bluff through four opponents. But once two opponents took weak actions and the other two folded, I needed to adjust. My opponents had made mistakes, both by tipping the strength of their hands and by not doing enough to get me out. Their mistakes could become my profit, but only if I took advantage of them. Otherwise, I would just be making a mistake right along with them.



It's not too often that a pot containing 30 big blinds is there for the taking. If you are lucky enough to have such an opportunity arise, make sure that you take a shot at it. It might not feel like it, but passing up chances like those can be just as bad as folding a winning hand.



Matt Lessinger is the author of The Book of Bluffs: How to Bluff and Win at Poker, available everywhere. You can find other articles of his at www.CardPlayer.com.