How I Was Brilliantly Outplayed

Poker is in a slump, and the 2009 Foxwoods Poker Classic proved it. It attracted 259 entrants for the $10,000 buy-in main event, the lowest turnout for a U.S.-based_ World Poker Tour_ event since Tunica in January of 2008, and down a whopping 25 percent from the 346 players who entered last year’s Classic. If you think the bad economy hasn’t affected poker players, take a look at those figures one more time. Obviously, large fields generally mean a lot of amateurs and a high expected value for a tournament pro. But smaller fields mean less variance, which can be a very good thing for one’s state of mind on the brutal tournament circuit. I thought it would be a good investment to enter the Foxwoods event.

I meandered about near my starting stack of 30,000 for much of day one. This still left me plenty deep during the 200-400 blinds/50 ante level, so when I opened for 1,000 from under the gun with A-K offsuit, I knew there would potentially be some interesting post-flop decisions. I got called by a young, relatively active player in late position. He hadn’t been playing like a maniac, but he definitely showed a willingness to get involved. I pegged him as an Internet professional, although I found out later that he plays more in brick-and-mortar casinos than online.

The flop came down 9-4-2 rainbow, and I made a standard continuation-bet of 1,600 into the 3,050 pot. Given the preflop action and positions, my range is much stronger than my opponent’s, so there’s no easy way for him to combat my strategy of continuation-betting the flop nearly 100 percent of the time here. The bet size of slightly more than half of the pot is normal for me when there aren’t many draws on board. If I’m ahead, I’m not overly worried about pricing in my opponent, and if I’m behind, I limit my exposure.

My opponent called, which caused me to revise my opinion about his holding. When he called preflop, he could’ve had anything reasonable. After his flop call, however, it seemed that he must’ve improved to at least a pair, with the small possibility of something like 6-5 suited for a gutshot-straight draw, or a stubborn call with something like A-Q or even A-J. I didn’t like my hand against his new range, and hoped to hit an ace or king.

The turn brought a 10, and I checked with the intention of giving up. One of his medium-strength holdings, 10-9, just got a lot stronger, and if he’d gotten real stubborn on the flop with something like A-10, I was in a world of trouble. And I hadn’t liked my hand much after the flop action, anyway. Check-folding seemed like the best play for this particular hand at this particular time. I also think it’s the best play from a broader-strategy standpoint. I have plenty of strong hands in my range when I raise from under the gun, bet the flop, and then check the turn (specifically, overpairs and sets). I don’t believe that check-folding A-K makes me exploitable here.

After I checked, my opponent, interestingly, checked behind. His play was extremely consistent with a medium-strength made hand like a middle pair. With a drawing hand, he probably would’ve bet the turn, looking for fold equity, and with a strong hand, he probably would’ve bet the turn for value, looking for a call, or so I reasoned. I still thought an ace or king would win me the hand on the river.

The river was a 5, and I checked again. Now, I couldn’t even beat the unlikely 6-5. If my opponent decided to bet, my intention was still to fold. My opponent then did something strange — he bet 1,200 into the 6,250 pot. This was less than I had bet on the flop, and it offered me 6-1 odds to call. The great price forced me to reconsider my plan of folding. Could my opponent really have been bluffing with something like K-J or Q-J? That would’ve required him to have called the flop with nothing but overcards against an early-position raiser (remember, he wouldn’t have picked up a straight draw until the turn).

Furthermore, a player betting small in position on the river is a massive favorite to be value-betting. Even though I needed to have a winner only 14 percent of the time to show a profit, I decided that I would win the showdown even less often, and quietly mucked my hand.

As my opponent raked in the small pot, he flashed his holecards — K J! His nonstandard river bet culminated a series of nonstandard plays that he’d made on every street. Many players wouldn’t call a preflop raise from an early-position player with K-J suited and deep chips (although, of course, some would). Few players would flat-call with nothing but overcards (a play known as “floating”) against the early-position player’s continuation-bet on the flop. Those who would try to float the flop would almost certainly bet the turn after their opponent checked. And on the river, I almost never see a bluff after I call someone who has just offered me 6-1 on my money, but my opponent showed me one here.

My opponent’s river bet worked for one simple reason: The story made sense. He represented that he had a medium pair and didn’t want to put in a lot of chips with it, but now that a relatively safe river card had come and I had checked twice, he was trying to extract just a little value. The story was so believable that I folded my A-K without having to think too long. I complimented my opponent on the play later, and he told me that it would’ve been OK with him even if I’d called his river bet. He said the advertising value alone would’ve been worth the 1,200 in chips. Many players don’t exercise this kind of meta-game thinking, and my opponent’s explanation for his play just made me respect it that much more.

Having said that, I do think my opponent would’ve been better off firing away on the turn rather than giving me a free shot to hit something on the river, and also risking that I would bet into him on the end. In my view, the equity that he had in winning the pot without a showdown was higher than the equity of seeing a free card and trying to hit a gutshot or one of his overcards.

But this is a minor quibble. I love my opponent’s creative play on the river (although I didn’t love it at the time), and I think it serves as an example of both how to represent a hand against a thinking opponent and how to make plays that have value not just for the current hand, but for future hands, as well.

Matt Matros is the author of The Making of a Poker Player, which is available online at www.CardPlayer.com. He is also a featured coach for stoxpoker.com.