Fast Play Creates Confusion

“I gave you $180 too much,” my friend Jason declared as I stacked the pot. “I wouldn’t have done it if you hadn’t overbet the Q-10 hand.”
He was accurate on both counts. He paid $180 too much, and probably wouldn’t have if I had played an earlier hand differently.

In a $30-$60 limit hold’em game, the field folded to me on the button. Holding the Q 10, I fired $60 forward, hoping to pick up the blinds. Jason, an aggressive player in the small blind, three-bet it, folding the big blind. Against an aggressive player who opens from late position with a raise in what might be an attempt to steal the blinds, three-betting from the small blind with a wide range of hands can be a good play. Among other things, it often blows out the big blind, increasing your chances of winning the pot. I didn’t need to have much of a hand to open with a raise, and Jason didn’t need much of a hand to pop me back.

Whatever Jason’s range was, my Q-10 offsuit didn’t play well against much of it. I called his reraise, and we took the flop off heads up. It came Q J 8 — top pair with a gutshot for me. Jason fired. I raised. He three-bet. I was pretty sure that he had me beat, but I also felt that he could be raising to take the lead with drawing hands in his range that I could beat: spade draws, J-10, maybe A-J or A-K, 10-10, or 9-9. Even if I was beat, I was only about 2-1 against an overpair, and around 2.5-1 against A-Q.

The price the pot was laying me, in combination with the chance of my hand being good plus the chance of sucking out, dictated that I see the hand down, even though my chance of winning was less than 50 percent. I wanted to see the hand down as cheaply as possible, yet win the maximum if my hand was good. I hit it again, overrepresenting my hand, with the intent of betting the turn and checking the river if I didn’t improve. That way, I got full value from his draws when my hand remained good, and an extra bet from the times I sucked out, as I could bet the river and likely get called. In the current situation, the advantages outweighed the risks. Jason called.

The turn was the K♠. I now had an open-ender, the second-nut flush draw, and a royal draw. That card took away some of his flush and hand range, and also might have given me more outs, particularly if Jason didn’t hold the A. As planned, I bet, still intent on checking the river if I didn’t improve. Jason called.

Swish! The A♦ hit, making my straight. I fired after Jason checked; he called, and showed me the A A. He had me crushed until the river. Plus, he had my flush draw covered. I’d gotten real lucky and sucked out, and knew it. Nonetheless, I felt I’d played my hand correctly based on the range of hands that Jason could have held! Jason shook his head in frustration as I stacked the chips.

In the next lap, I called a cutoff opening raiser with the K 8 from the small blind. Jason tossed in $30 from the big blind. The flop came down A 8 7. I checked, Jason bet, and Mr. Opener flat-called. With second pair, I tossed in $30, looking to catch a card. Nothing but net again, as the 8 hit, giving me three eights. I checked, looking to check-raise.

Dutifully, Jason bet, Mr. Opener raised, and I three-bet it. Jason thought for a while and called, as did Mr. Opener. I fired on the river again, and was called by Jason. Mr. Opener flashed the A 10 and folded. He had aces with the nut-flush draw. He’d slow-played a vulnerable hand on the flop, looking to get extra value; instead, he let me take a cheap card off that crippled his hand. Jason showed down 9-8, and I dragged another pot from him.

That’s when Jason said, “I gave you $180 too much. I wouldn’t have done it if you didn’t overbet the Q-10 hand.”

The circumstances of both hands played very well for me. The cards I caught not only made my hands, but trapped Jason for extra bets. But beyond running well, the way that I played my cards created additional value. Oftentimes, when observant opponents analyze your play, they look at only the play and the consequence, not your reasoning. This leads them to misread future hands and make errors. My fast play with the Q-10 caused Jason to put in three big bets incorrectly on the second hand, which he otherwise might not have done.

Playing your hands in a fast manner can induce weak calls from your opponents in future hands. Beware, however, of playing hands way too loosely in highly unprofitable situations, with the intent of making up your weak bets with weak calls from your opponents in the future. Against aware, knowledgeable opponents, that strategy is transparent. As is the case with so many poker concepts, overdoing things can turn potential positives into net negatives.

Create an aggressive playing style in order to broaden your potential range of hands in your opponents’ minds, making you harder to read, and their decisions more difficult and less likely to be correct. But do it in a manner that doesn’t give up edge on your hands. Doing that effectively takes good playing knowledge, knowledge of your opponents, and a creative poker mind. It will confuse your opponents, expand your range of hands, make you difficult to read, and, most importantly, add chips to your stack!

Longtime poker pro and author Roy Cooke’s Card Player column has appeared since 1992. A successful Las Vegas real estate broker since 1990, his website is www.roycooke.com. Should you wish to inquire regarding real-estate matters — including purchase, sale, or mortgage — his phone number is (702) 396-6575. Roy’s longtime collaborator John Bond’s website is www.johnbondwriting.com. Find John and Roy on Facebook.