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Railbird Roundtable

by Bryan Devonshire |  Published: Jun 11, 2009

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Planning Ahead Preflop: Deciphering Options Against a Button Raise

In a recent PokerStars $500 event, with 154 players remaining and the money starting at 144, this hand played out. Our hero, Harrison “gibler321” Gimbel, had been moved to this table about five hands earlier. With the blinds at 1,000-2,000, and a 200 ante, the action is folded to Mike “Timex” McDonald on the button, with 101,345, and he opens for 5,000. Our hero is in the small blind with 116,860 and the 6Heart Suit 6Club Suit, and he three-bets to 16,345. Timex shoves, our hero calls, and his pair holds up against K-Q offsuit.

22-11 FFT preflop

Preflop, our options are to fold, call, reraise and fold, reraise and call, or shove. Let’s look at each:

Call
This is by far the most “standard” option. We have 6-6 and 50 big blinds, and we’re near the bubble. We don’t want to reraise and get shoved on, and our hand is strong enough to see a flop. We don’t want to reraise and fold, because of the strength of our hand. We don’t want to reraise and call, because it’s a pair of sixes, we’re almost on the bubble, and we have an above-average stack of more than 50 big blinds in a tournament with a very slow structure. “Flatting [flat-calling] basically has to show a profit, either because you can get to showdown a bunch or he’s going to spew a bunch when you flop a set, or some combination of both,” says Team PokerStars pro Steve Paul-Ambrose.

So, calling has to be fine, and is probably what most players would do in this situation.

Reraise
It’s safe to assume that Timex is opening with a range that is pretty wide here. Therefore, if we reraise, he should be folding most of his garbage. There are enough random hands with overcards to 6-6 that we don’t want to flat [flat-call] out of position to anybody opening here, and we especially don’t want to play this hand out of position to some sicko like Timex. He’s a solid player, and we’re going to lose the guessing game much of the time. So, screw him; no free flops, no raising with garbage on my small blind, I reraise!

Here’s where players make the most mistakes, by not planning ahead. We’ve realized that he’s very likely to have garbage. But, before we ever decide that reraising is best, we must consider what is going to happen next.

Our solid, aggressive villain on the button is not going to just call, and if he does, we can get away from our hand pretty easily if we don’t flop a set. He’s either going to fold or make a committing reraise. What percentage of the time is he actually folding to our three-bet, and what percentage of the time is he going to be stuffing?

This is where things get tricky. First, we need to establish what range of hands he’s opening in this spot. We can’t really be sure, but we can safely assume that it’s a very wide range.

Next, we have to decide how wide his four-bet stuff range is. Since it’s close to the bubble and his stack is big enough to cripple our stack, we can safely assume that it’s at least 12 percent, or 2-2+, A-10+, K-Q. It’s wider when you consider the times that he’s restealing our resteal. Since the villain knows that it’s a very good spot to be three-betting him, he adjusts by four-bet shoving lighter, especially since he has so much fold equity with these stacks and being this close to the bubble.

So, if we decide to reraise, we must know what we’re going to do with a shove; we must have a plan.

Reraise and call a shove, or fold?

Let me say first that it’s a cEV (chip-equity) mistake to reraise and fold. Using the four-bet shove range given above, 6-6 is 47.14 percent. Let’s say that we reraise to 16,000 over the 5,000 open and the villain shoves for 101,000 total. We’re then having to call 85,000 more for a shot at winning 123,800, about 1.46-1 on our money. Our needed equity is: 1/2.46 = .4065 = 40.7 percent. Therefore, since we are 47 percent versus his range, we are giving up equity by folding. If his range is tighter — say, 6-6+ instead of 2-2+ — our value drops to 40.7 percent and a fold is fine. A player’s range is the predominant factor in making the correct decision in these situations.

If we fold, it is for ICM reasons. ICM stands for Independent Chip Model. It’s pretty complex, but basically it hinges on the fact that every chip you win is worth less than every chip you had before, because you can never win 100 percent of the prize pool. Since profit is based on finishing position, not number of chips, ICM becomes of even greater importance at pay jumps. Our stack is worth X percent of the prize pool right now; if we bust out before the bubble, our equity becomes 0 percent, yet doubling our stack does not double our equity. Therefore, even though we will not bust out if we lose this hand, we will be left with only five big blinds and will greatly risk not making the money. If we could bust out by calling, it could swing the percentages needed to make a call profitable much closer to the 47 percent we have, thus making a call much thinner.

However, since we will be on the button the next hand and can probably fold our way to the money, we probably should be calling a shove, but it’s not exactly a spot that we’re happy with.

Another thing to think about is that if we want to reraise-fold 6-6, we really should be reraising all of our range — any two cards. Since he’s never flatting, by three-betting and folding, we’re saying that we think he’s going to fold a big enough percentage of the time to make three-betting profitable, since we’re not planning on calling a shove. Therefore, it doesn’t matter what we have.

Shove
We can’t do that, can we? We have 50 big blinds. Ah, but we can, and it will show a profit. Bryan Paris first came up with this idea: “What about straight shipping over his open? It should be +cEV if his button opening range is really any two cards (which I don’t doubt), and I think you bust out a small enough percentage of the time to make it worth it for ICM, as well.”

How much +cEV depends on the villain’s opening range. Since the villain also is thinking about ICM, and is forced to make a tournament-life decision by our shove, his call range is going to be very tight — probably 10-10 + or A-K, or 3.5 percent. It might include 9-9, and might be as tight as J-J, but it probably doesn’t include A-Q, since he’s afraid of A-K so much from our unknown hero.

Therefore, if he opens 100 percent of the time, the 96.5 percent of the time he folds, we win 9,800 × .965 = 9,457 in equity. And the 3.5 percent of the time he calls, we win 106,045 31.5 percent of the time and lose 100,145 68.5 percent of the time, for equity of (0.035 × 0.315 × 106,045) – (0.035 × 0.685 × 100,145) = -1,231.83. Therefore, our net equity for shoving, given these ranges, is 8,225, which is a pretty hefty chunk. Dan “djk123” Kelly first posted these numbers in support of a shove. I adjusted the amount lost when called and losing to reflect the small blind and the ante removed.

But, before we start shoving 50 big blinds in every spot like this, in which our opponents have a wide opening range but a narrow calling range, we must consider a few things. First, there’s the big blind to think about, as he’s going to cold-call a certain percentage of the time. We also need to know that as the villain’s opening range drops, so does our profit by shoving.

Fold
This is the easiest way out. It has the lowest variance but is not the most profitable play. It saves us the most headaches, and when all of our other options suck, folding is always fine.

22-11 RRT Pro
This is one of those spots where whatever we do, it feels awkward. Folding seems wrong because we’re significantly ahead of his button raising range; we have 55 percent equity versus the top 50 percent of hands, and 63 percent versus any two cards. Reraising and calling are both awkward because Timex is going to put us in tough spots. Estimating the EV [expected value] of reraising is tough because Timex’s four-betting range isn’t clear, but calling basically has to show a profit.
Steve Paul-Ambrose
We’re going to be put in some tough spots post-flop, but that’s not really a reason to make [calling preflop] an inferior play. The concern is that we’re going to fold the best hand a lot and not get paid off when we flop a set. But unless Timex can see our hand, this just isn’t possible. Either he’s going to barrel a lot and we’ll get paid off with our set very frequently, or we’re going to be able to get to showdown a lot unimproved. And with somewhere between 55 percent and 63 percent equity against his range, we’re going to have the best hand a lot when we get to showdown. — Steve Paul-Ambrose
Harrison Gimbel
I’ve been playing high-stakes multitable tournaments (HSMTTs) for a while, so I’m aware of the other HSMTT regulars around me. I know that Timex (like most others) is going to raise the button light here. In my opinion, calling would be tough. First, 6-6 is ahead of his range completely. Second, he is a known sicko and has position on me. On flops like A-J-9 rainbow, I would get no value from my sixes. Since calling seemed pretty weak, I decided to three-bet. Before I three-bet, I thought out my options. Raise-folding 6-6 here is pretty weak, and I think I would be better off calling or folding if I were to do that. I felt that roughly 10 away from the money, his four-bet range was wide enough to make 6-6 a call. I called and he had K-Q offsuit, and I held. — Harrison Gimbel

Conclusion
I hope this helps with your thought process when considering the best action given preflop conditions. Remember to always plan ahead. Don’t just think, “I have two sixes, call,” without considering how owned you will get post-flop, out of position, by a good player. Don’t think “reraise” without considering what to do with a shove.

This hand came from a thread in a forum. Interesting and new concepts like this are regularly discussed, and information is freely shared, in forums. You’re missing out by not at least lurking and absorbing the analysis. Spade Suit

Bryan “Devo” Devonshire has been a professional since the fall of 2003, after going jobless in Colorado. An expert wilderness guide with a specialization in white-water rafting, he got his start propping a $2-$5 spread-limit game in Cripple Creek, Colorado, while serving on Search and Rescue. He hit the tournament scene in 2006, taking second in his first-ever World Series of Poker event; to date, he has cashed for more than $800,000 live and more than $380,000 online. A Southern California native and Las Vegas resident, he can be reached at [email protected].