Final Table Takedown -- Prahlad Friedman

Prahlad Friedman is one of the most feared players around, both online and live, due to his unrelenting, aggressive style of play. He has cashed in tournaments for more than $2 million and won a coveted bracelet in a 2003 World Series of Poker $1,500 pot-limit hold’em event. He also finished 20th, for $494,797, in the 2006 WSOP main event. But his worldwide recognition comes mainly from the millions he’s raked in playing in online high-stakes cash games.

Event 2009 World Poker Tour Legends of Poker main event
Players in the Event 279
First Prize $1,009,000
Buy-in $10,000
Finish First

Key Concepts: Metagame; perceived table image; adjusting to a table and changing gears.

Stacks Prahlad Friedman – 1,050,000 Mike Krescanko – 500,000
Blinds 10,000-20,000
Antes 3,000
Players at the Table 8
Players Remaining 17

Friedman limps in from the small blind with the K 10.

Craig Tapscott: Oftentimes, it’s the hands prior to the final table that set up a win: metagame, image, aggression, and so on. You eventually knocked out Krescanko at the final table, but let’s dissect this hand and see how the outcome served you.

Prahlad Friedman: I’d been raising Krescanko’s big blind relentlessly, every time it was my small blind. It seemed that between the hands I was dealt and my aggression, I was just going after him, and for good reason. He was the tightest player I’d played with in almost the entire tournament. He seemed like a good player, but he was playing just very good hands. This time, I knew I would have to limp in as I looked down at K-10 offsuit, because I expected him to make a move.

CT: And if he does raise?

PF: I could just call, even though it’s not a very good hand out of position. By limping, I can’t get reraised, and perhaps bluffed out. In addition, I want to mix it up.

Krescanko checks his option from the big blind.
Flop: J 9 2 (pot: 64,000)
Friedman bets 35,000. Krescanko calls.

CT: Any read on his call here?

PF: By the way he called, I could tell that he liked the flop and wasn’t going anywhere. It felt like he had middle pair, but didn’t feel like he could raise in this spot.

Turn: 8 (pot: 134,000)

PF: Now I’m open-ended, and I’m definitely putting him on a 9. He might even have a really bad 9, such as 9-3, because I limped and he checked.

Friedman bets 100,000. Krescanko calls.
River: 6 (pot: 334,000)
Friedman moves all in, having Krescanko covered.

CT: What’s your take on how he perceives your hand at the river?

PF: The flush gets there, and I somehow could have made some kind of weird straight on the end, or could have made my straight on the turn. And I could have a jack.

CT: And your take on his cards?

PF: I’m sure that he has a 9, and I don’t think he had a flush draw. If he did, I could have expected a raise preflop with a suited hand, or at least a raise on the flop. I didn’t think he had two pair, unless the 6 hit him. So unless he had 9-6, I felt that a bluff would work. So, I moved him all in, putting his tournament life at risk.

Krescanko calls 342,000, reveals the K 9, and rakes in the pot of 1,018,000.

CT: Wow.

PF: Yeah. This was a player who was real tight the whole tournament, and the one player you could probably bluff. It was a bit discouraging, because I had played so well for the entire tournament. And now, I make a ballsy good play, knowing exactly what Krescanko has, and it just backfired on me. I thought I had played the hand well, and it just didn’t pay off.

CT: Did he say anything?

PF: He said that he thought I had bet it too strong.

CT: Meaning?

PF: Well, that I have to have a huge hand or nothing. He didn’t put me on an in-between hand. He just thought I overplayed it. Maybe if I had bet less, he would have folded on the end, but I really don’t think so.

CT: How do you use their perception of your image as an advantage?

PF: My image is due mostly to the ESPN coverage of my heads-up match in a Circuit event against Chris Ferguson, because they showed a bluff or two. People tend to remember the bluffs on TV. Now people are thinking that BLUFF is written on my forehead. They’ve seen me reraise Jeff Lisandro with 9-2 out of the small blind in a WSOP main event. So, I have to be aware of people’s perceptions. And, I have to try to produce a good hand when I’m three-barreling. I’m capable of playing very tight. I can adjust. And it’s kind of hard for my opponents to know what mood I’m in from moment to moment. Sometimes I’m raising and reraising every hand, and other times I will sit there and fold every hand. Being able to change gears is very important.

CT: And you’re changing gears due to the situations that a table presents?

PF: It’s really how I feel they think of me. If they’re thinking I’m a little too active, I try to be one step ahead of them, because I can just feel the energy of a reraise coming when I’ve been very active. So, I will then tighten up dramatically. That way, when I do get reraised, I’m ready.

CT: You will have a strong hand and pounce.

PF: Yeah. When I know that people are going to start reraising me, I want to come in with a hand that I will probably four-bet, or I’ll call and see a flop. I hate raising and then having to fold. It depends on my table, like this past year’s WSOP main event. The players at the table were in awe of the event and knew who I was from television. So, I just proceeded to raise every hand, and when I had it, I would show them. They thought they needed to stay away from me. My stack went from 30,000 to 120,000, and it was my best first day ever. It’s all about your table. If it’s full of wild Internet players, you’re forced to step back and not play so aggressively.

CT: Do you run into online guys and pick up on their play against you?

PF: I do sense when some guy is an online player. Against those guys, I have to be careful about bluffing. I have an online image of being wild, and the same goes for tournaments. So, having that gear of solid poker and playing good hands is for me. When they have an A-J or A-Q, they’re treating it like A-K, a couple of notches up, because of my perceived range of hands. Then, they’ll overvalue their hands. Adjusting to the table, changing gears, and knowing my opponent’s perceptions of my game have been my biggest assets. My wild image going to the Legends final table was great for me, because it was super bluffy, and everyone remembered this three-barrel bluff.

CT: The traps were set.

PF: Yes. And my game plan going into the final six was to play really solid poker, something that people weren’t going to expect from me. It served me well.