Nonstandard Hands From the World Poker Tour

Many of the top tournament poker players who employ a mathematics-based style have what Dr. Bill Chen (two-time World Series of Poker bracelet winner) calls a “core strategy.” That is, before a tournament starts, these players try to have a plan for every conceivable situation. Then, in the heat of battle, they execute what they think is an optimal play, regardless of their perceptions of their opponents.

As a math guy myself, I’m a huge proponent of the core strategy, and of trying to play optimally instead of exploitatively. When you play exploitatively, you are trying to take advantage of your opponents’ particular brand of mistakes. You’re basically saying, “I know that what I’m doing would not be correct against a good player, but I’m doing it anyway because I’m very confident in my read of this specific opponent.” There are several problems with playing exploitatively, and among the biggest is that most poker players are not as good as they think they are, whether in reading their opponents or in playing their own hands. But as much as I try to focus on optimal play, there are times when I feel virtually forced to play exploitatively. Here are two examples, from the recent World Poker Tour event at Borgata, of where I decided to deviate from my usual course of action.

Hand No. 1: The blinds were 75-150, and my stack size was 30,000. An early-position player limped in, and I limped in right behind him with the A 7. A middle-position player limped in, the button and small blind folded, and it was up to the big blind. He exercised his option and raised to 700 total.

I should stop and tell you that this player had raised limpers more often than not when he’d had the opportunity, and this was the fourth or fifth time that he’d exercised his option from the big blind. Getting back to the hand, the early-position limper folded, I called, and the other player folded. We were heads up with 1,775 in the pot.

The flop came 7-6-2 rainbow, and my opponent led out for 2,000. Normally, when an opponent overbets the pot, I lay down a hand like a pair of sevens, even when it’s top pair/top kicker. My opponent is representing an overpair, and it’s hard to imagine that I’d have much in the way of implied odds if either an ace or a 7 hit. It’s too expensive to plan to call down every street, and too risky to raise. Folding seems prudent. But, this player had never failed to continuation-bet after raising, and he’d been overbetting the pot constantly. I don’t like to stray from my core strategy, but I felt that I had a good reason to do it here. My plan was to call him down.

I called, and the turn brought a queen. He fired out 4,000, and I called again. The river was a king, and my opponent tanked for a long while, clearly uncomfortable, then finally checked. His check meant one of four things: (1) He was giving up on his bluff. (2) He had a medium-strength hand and didn’t like the river card. (3) He caught a king and was planning to check-call. (4) He was trapping with a big hand. Normally, with this analysis, I would check behind and show down my pair of sevens, afraid of getting check-called or check-raised. But my read of this particular opponent ruled out options (3) and (4). I didn’t think his discomfort was an act, and I thought that he had either a medium pocket pair or a complete bluff. If he had a medium pocket pair, I didn’t want to let him just show down the hand for free, so I decided to bet 6,200 into the 13,775 pot. I’m a strange kind of math guy; that is, a math guy who occasionally goes with his reads. My opponent thought for a few seconds, and folded. I may or may not have had the best hand, but I wanted to make sure that I won the pot either way. I was able to bet the river only because I had severely discounted the possibility that my opponent was trapping with a big hand, or trying to check and call with something like A-K.

Hand No. 2: The blinds were 500-1,000, with a 100 ante, and my stack size was 80,000. I opened from under the gun to 2,400 with A-K. The player in the next seat made it 6,200. Here’s where I should tell you that this opponent had, in the first two hours of play, (1) three-bet me blind vs. blind, (2) four-bet after opening from early position, and then showed 8-3 suited, (3) check-raised three opponents on the turn, and then showed down a pair of deuces, and (4) made two squeeze plays; in one, he called a four-bet and then folded to a bet on the flop (from me).

Everyone else folded. Ordinarily, in this situation, I would do one of two things: I’d call the reraise and see what developed on the flop, or I’d four-bet to 20,000 or so, planning to fold to an all-in bet (his stack size was similar to mine). Against this hyperaggressive opponent, however, I thought that I needed a different plan. Because his reraising range was so wide, I didn’t want to call and let him see the flop (relatively) cheaply. But I also thought he was aggressive enough that I couldn’t four-bet, planning to fold to an all-in bet. So, I decided to four-bet to 21,000, planning to call an all-in bet and take my chances. Instead, my opponent called the four-bet, leaving himself 54,000 behind.

The flop came A-5-4 with two hearts. Normally, this would be a close decision between checking to induce a bluff and betting for value. Against a very aggressive opponent, however, the decision was easy. I checked, and after a few seconds, my opponent moved all in for 54,000. I called immediately, of course, and my opponent tabled 4-3 offsuit! I was glad to see that my read had been correct.

If you’re choosing to play exploitatively, as I was here, you’d better be right about what’s going on at the table. For instance, I sure would’ve felt silly calling off 80,000 preflop and having my opponent show me two aces! But this time, anyway, I’d been right, and my opponent had been out of line. The unhappy ending to this story is that a deuce fell on the river, and I busted out a few hands later.

The most important part of successful poker play is having a fundamentally sound strategy that’s capable of succeeding even against tough opponents. Once you gain confidence and experience, however, and once you are willing to live with yourself if you’re wrong, it can be a good idea to adjust for specific opponents. You just might pick up a little extra profit by sometimes playing exploitatively and trusting your reads; even some math guys think so.

Matt Matros is the author of The Making of a Poker Player, which is available online at www.CardPlayer.com. He is also a featured coach for stoxpoker.com.