Double-Edged Sword

On Dec. 16, I was playing day three of the $15,000 buy-in WPT (World Poker Tour) Doyle Brunson Classic at Bellagio. After day two, with 130 players remaining, I was one of the chip leaders, and was full of confidence. You see, all of my bluffs had worked flawlessly, and I felt like I was reading my opponents perfectly. In my last two columns, I talked about playing fast, finding a niche in poker, and that "manufacturing chips" separates the great players from the very good players. Now let's take a look at the downside of fast play.

With 412,000 in chips, all I really had to do was play "lockup" poker (super tight) and I'd have a great chance to end the day with more than 1 million in chips. I have used these "super tight" tactics to surf relatively effortlessly to the chip lead for years. Yet, I wanted to see what fast and loose tactics, based on my reading ability, would yield.

On the very first hand, I was in the big blind, and the button raised. My instincts told me to reraise with 9-2 offsuit, and I studied for about 90 seconds before I folded the hand faceup, saying, "I will reraise with anything; do not mess with my blinds today." I should have pulled the trigger, and then maybe I would have avoided the next two hands.

On the second hand dealt, the cutoff (one off the button) raised, and I called from the small blind with the A J. The flop was Q-9-4, and we both checked. The turn card was a 7, I bet out small, and he called. The river was an ace, I bet out 24,000, and he made it 60,000 to go. I called, and he showed me A-9 offsuit. I felt sick. Why did A-9 beat A-J suited? Why did an ace come on the river? Yet, I could have reraised preflop and won it, and I should have folded on the river. There was no one to blame but myself!

On the third hand of the day, I opened for 12,000 from the button with 9-8, and the small blind made it 30,000 to go. I decided to send a message early that a reraise wouldn't necessarily get rid of me, and I called (looking back now, I hate this call!). The flop was A-Q-8, he bet 25,000, and I called. On the turn, he checked, I bet 30,000, he raised, and I folded. He later claimed that he had pocket aces!



In the first three hands dealt, I had blown more than 100,000 in chips! But, I wasn't ready to abandon my fast play quite yet. I kept raising preflop, almost every single hand, and I won back about 25,000 or so by playing fast. Then, the upside of fast play hit, or did it? I opened for 9,000 with K-Q, and the big blind called. The flop was K-6-4, he checked, and I bet 12,000. I tried to look like I was weak when I put my chips into the pot, and I was praying that he would move all in. I knew that I had to call, so I was hoping to lure my opponent into moving in with a weak hand. After a minute, he did indeed move all in, and I snap-called 60,000 (roughly) more. He said, "Oops, I have bottom pair (the 4 3) and a backdoor-flush draw." This was sweet; I would be back over 400,000 unless …

The turn card was the 8, giving him a flush draw, and I thought, "Don't do it to me!" Alas, the river was the 3, and I was sick.

One positive aspect of fast play is that you get people to commit their chips with weak hands, because it is hard for them to believe that you have a strong hand every time. The downside is that they raise weak when you do have nothing, which forces you to fold. And then, of course, the final downside is that they occasionally draw out on you. With super tight play, opponents do not outdraw you as often, because they lay down their weak hands. The term "double-edged sword" comes to mind when I think of fast play.

I slowed down a little bit for a while, and when the player under the gun opened for 8,000 and the next guy to act (Roy Winston) made it 24,000 to go, I didn't know what to do with my pocket nines (call or fold?). Finally, I opted to call. The flop was 9 8 2, Winston checked, and I bet 25,000. Winston called, the turn was the 10, and he moved all in for 67,000. I thought to myself, "Wow, was that card unlucky. They put four spades on the board when I have top set! But wait a minute, how can he have a big spade? He would have moved all in on the flop if he had one, right?" I had only 100,000 left, but I opted to call, and Winston got up from his seat, tabling his 8 7. I thought, "Wow, he is actually drawing live here!" The river was the 4, and we split the pot. Ouch! Again, I put my money into the pot in another great situation. As it turned out, I was unlucky in some big pots; thus, conservative tactics would have yielded better results on this day, because with conservative tactics, I would have received a lot less action.

Learn more about Phil by going to his website, www.PhilHellmuth.com, and visit his webstore at www.PokerBrat.com.