Railbird Roundtable

The Situation:
It’s the third level of the 2009 $10,000 L.A. Poker Classic main event, and the blinds are 75-150. The table is tougher than average, but nobody is dominant. We started with 20,000 in chips.

The under-the-gun [UTG] player (40,000), a middle-aged man from the East Coast, opens for 400. He’s shown goofy tendencies thus far. He seems to know Mike Matusow (sitting to my right) personally. The hijack and cutoff positions call, Chad Brown calls from the button, Matusow (18,000) calls from the small blind, and I (25,000) call from the big blind with the 9 4.

I called preflop for a pretty level-one reason: It was soooooted, and I was getting like infinity-to-1 odds. There are risks in calling here with this weak holding, though. This pot is incredibly bloated already, and I am out of position against a lot of players. I’m basically playing to make two pair or better, and then I’m still going to be careful. If you have problems releasing hands, fold hands like this preflop in spots like this.

Flop (2,400): Q 9 3

Everybody checks. Yeah, I know that I flopped a flush draw and a pair. In many situations when I flop this well, I try to get my opponents to put in as much money as possible on the flop and then fold. Betting and three-bet shoving is a great way to do this. I can even do it here because the pot is so bloated already. If I bet 1,800 and someone raises to something like 5,500-7,000, I can shove for a total of more than 24,000, winning the maximum with minimum risk.

There’s definitely a fine line between leading and checking here. I generally prefer to lead and shove when it’s two- to four-handed, but tend to be a bit more defensive when it’s five-handed or more, mostly because the chance of someone (oftentimes, there are two someones here) having me crushed is stronger. For example, if I run into a set and a bigger flush draw, I am miserable. But I wouldn’t mind taking my hand all in against one player, because even in the worst possible scenarios, I’m still not that much of a dog. I’m 28 percent against top set, and 36 percent against the J 10; however, I’m pretty close or a favorite against everything else (against A-Q, K-K, and A-A, I’m about 45 percent, and against the A K, I’m a 52 percent favorite). Shorthanded, I’m close enough against their range that with the fold equity I earn by bet-shoving, it makes it a positive EV [expected value] play; however, against multiple hands, the likelihood of running into hands that kill me makes leading a negative EV play. Plus, I have a bad pair, bad kicker, and bad draw. I’m not betting for value, I’m bluffing. Lastly, by checking, I give them a chance to make a worse hand (a smaller flush) or myself a chance to make a better hand and get value later (with trips or two pair).

Turn (2,400): 6

Ding! I made my flush. The bad news is that it’s the fifth nuts. Before it’s even out, Matusow bets 3,000, using three yellow chips (1,000 denomination), and I know for a fact that it’s a mistake. Players’ hands give away more tells than anything, and after his hand released this bet, it was pretty obvious that he had messed up. He meant to bet either two 1,000 chips or three purple chips (500 denomination). So, now it’s my turn. After making this bet, Mikey has 15,000 and change remaining, I have almost 25,000, and there are four players yet to act after me. It’s a pretty gross spot, and the difficulty of this decision is a great example of a reason to fold this hand preflop.

So, now what, right? If I raise, it’s going to be committing myself to Mikey’s stack, for sure, and almost committing myself. I decide to just call, completely willing to fold if the action is raised and then Mikey shoves. I know this line is giving the A a good price to draw against my hand, but I’m not putting any more money in on a fourth-spade river anyway. With the depth of the stacks, I feel that calling here is more optimal. Remember, even though there’s 5,400 in this pot right now, we’re still playing 75-150, and we’re early in a very soft $10,000 field. Losing 160 big blinds in a six-way pot with a 9-high flush is pretty gross.

I call the bet, and then the UTG player, who was the initial raiser, calls quickly. Everybody else folds.

River (11,400): 5

Matusow thinks for 30-45 seconds and bets 5,000. He has 10,000 behind.

First, I vomit. Matusow is super snug on day one of a tournament. I had already watched him overlimping with A-K, folding big hands post-flop, and generally playing small-ball strategy, whereby he wins a lot of small pots, loses a decent number of medium ones, and plays big pots only when he feels like he’s crushing his opponents. This is based on my read in the previous three hours, past history, and general strategy inferences deduced from the style I’d seen him employ. I also have the player behind me to think about. A good player is never flatting [flat-calling] with a bigger flush on the turn, because so much of Mike’s and my ranges include sets, flushes, and the A.

Basically, I have a decision to make about Matusow’s hand. Is he leading into the two of us for less than half the pot (which also is a third of his stack) on the river with a hand that is worse than my fifth-nut flush? Possibly. It could be a blocker-bet with a smaller flush. I doubt that it’s a bluff. Or, it’s a value-bet with a bigger flush. I really don’t think he’s betting worse than a flush here. The key, though, is your opponent. You need to figure out what range of hands he’s betting, and then make your decisions accordingly.

I fold. I didn’t think that Mike was betting a worse flush 25 percent of the time (which is the frequency that he needs to be doing it for my call to be profitable, since I’m getting better than 3-1 on my money). There is also the UTG player to think about. After I fold, the UTG player quickly shoves, Mikey tanks forever, and they engage in some table banter. The UTG player tells Mike to fold, and says, “I’ve got it, I’ll show you.” Mikey folds, showing the J 8, and the UTG player shows only the A.

Pro Analysis
In my opinion, your limit hold’em background gets you into a crappy spot here, Devo. Your preflop price is clearly good, but being out of position with such a poor holding when multiway this deep-stacked will cause a lot of problems for you. The reverse implied odds are too great, not to mention that everyone loves to play suited aces, and such, so even when you hit your hand, you often tend to hate life. Calling in spots like these also tends to increase your variance greatly.

As played, I would just call the river. I think Mike is more than capable of value-betting two-pair hands and sets, but he is probably not going to call a shove with those holdings after betting into two people on the river. I think he will probably call you some percentage of the time with smaller flushes if you shove, and will also fold with smaller flushes a percentage of the time. Every time we are beat, we obviously get called. I think there is not a ton of value to raising the river, so just call. — Amit Makhija

I really don’t think that Mike would put that much of his stack at risk this early without a bigger flush than yours. This is a pretty sick spot, but I think the correct play is to fold [the river]. Do you ever consider raising the turn here? — Matt Vengrin

I think shoving this river as a bluff against Mike would be a very, very sexy hand, especially if you think the UTG player always has the A here. — Jimmy Fricke

Did you ever think about squeezing preflop here? I kind of like a squeeze in this spot. Your hand has pretty bad reverse implied odds post-flop, but the preflop value is great here. You know that Mike, Chad, and the cutoff are folding. The hijack might have flatted [flat-called] with a big hand, and the UTG player might have a hand, but you can use the Devo image to enhance the odds that a squeeze in this scenario would work, because I think you have a pretty tight image. And if it does work and you want to start getting more action, you can use it as a low-risk opportunity to do so by showing your hand. — Jeremy Joseph

Conclusion

I honestly like Jeremy’s response the best. This hand does suck post-flop, so folding is fine, but there’s so much money out there that calling is fine. But squeezing is clearly best, since I’m going to succeed such a high percentage of the time that it’s clearly a positive EV play. I can squeeze in spots like this with napkins, since nobody ever does it, and they rarely will call (I probably will see a flop 25 percent of the time here, max, if I make it 3,000). Anyway, as the hand was played, I hope that you see why these hands should be avoided, in general, because these decisions are so difficult.

If there are any types of games or situations from which you would like to see hands discussed, feel free to e-mail me and let me know.

Bryan “Devo” Devonshire has been a professional since the fall of 2003, after going jobless in Colorado. An expert wilderness guide with a specialization in white-water rafting, he got his start propping a $2-$5 spread-limit game in Cripple Creek, Colorado, while serving on Search and Rescue. He hit the tournament scene in 2006, taking second in his first-ever World Series of Poker event; to date, he has cashed for more than $800,000 live and more than $380,000 online. A Southern California native and Las Vegas resident, he can be reached at [email protected].