Commitment

Players ask one of these questions all the time in the midst of postmortem analysis: “Did I commit myself to that hand?” “Was I pot stuck?” “Had I already been priced in?” No matter what the context or phrasing is, the question always boils down to the same thing. The player is saying, “I don’t think my hand is good anymore, but have I put in too many chips to fold it?”

It’s a very common situation in no-limit hold’em tournaments for one player to bet and a short stack to move all in for just a little bit more. Oftentimes in these spots, the bettor is almost entirely convinced that he doesn’t have the best hand, which sometimes leads him to make very bad folds. Conversely, a thinking player who assumes that he’s “pot-committed” can end up making a terrible call in a similar scenario. So, how do we know which is which?

There are very few hard and fast rules that you should follow at the poker table, but here are two guidelines that should help in determining whether you’re committed or you still have options. One: You usually shouldn’t fold preflop after voluntarily putting chips in, getting 2-1 or more against a single all-in player. Two: You usually shouldn’t fold post-flop after voluntarily putting chips in, getting 5-1 or more against a single all-in player.

These guidelines arise naturally after we spend some time thinking about typical preflop and post-flop scenarios. For example, let’s say you’ve opened preflop from late position for 600, with blinds of 100-200 and a 25 ante. You have a fairly loose range of any ace, any suited king, any two paint cards, suited connectors down to 6-5 suited, and any pair. Let’s say that this particular time, you have A-2 offsuit — one of the worst hands you could hold in this spot. Everyone folds to the big blind, who moves all in on you for 2,000 total. Assuming a nine-handed table, it costs you 1,400 to try to win 2,925 (the big blind’s 2,000, plus 100 from the small blind, plus your 600, plus 225 in antes). You’re getting just over 2-1 on your money — 2.09-1, to be more precise — which means that you need to win the showdown 32.4 percent of the time to show a profit.

What hands might the short stack in the big blind move with here? Maybe something like A-10+, A-8+ suited, any pair, K-J+, Q-J suited? That seems pretty reasonable to me. A-2 offsuit has 34.4 percent equity against that range, enough to call the all-in bet. If, instead, we hold 6-5 suited, we do even better, with 35.9 percent equity. K-2 suited does the worst of anything in our range, and even that hand has 32.8 percent equity. Assuming that we weren’t opening with random junk like 7-2 offsuit (which has only 26.1 percent equity against the all-in range), we should call the all-in raise with any hand that we could have.

It’s very convenient for us that the bottom end of an opening range typically has about a 33 percent chance of beating an all-in reraising range preflop. It’s convenient because when we’re getting 2-1 on our money, we know that we need better than a 33 percent chance of winning the showdown in order to profit. And we know that when someone reraises all in to about three times our initial bet, we’re getting about 2-1 on our money. If you want to calculate your price to the exact number, you’re certainly free to go ahead and do it. The beauty is that in most situations, you don’t have to crunch these numbers, thanks to our 2-1 guideline.

But we must remember that our guideline is a guideline, and not a rule. Let’s say that you’re very good at reading people, and you know that a particular player in that big blind will reraise all in only with A-K, A-Q, or a pair of nines or better. Now, your A-2 offsuit has only 26.6 percent equity, and you should let it go. Reading ability combined with understanding of the mathematics leads to the best decision-making in this game.

Preflop, it’s pretty hard for one hand to be in really bad shape against another. Even if you have K-2 suited and run into aces, you’ve got a fighting 15 percent chance of winning. That’s why it’s never too big a mistake to call an all-in bet when you’re getting a decent price before the flop. Post-flop is another story altogether. You might have a good hand, like pocket jacks on a flop of Q-7-4. But if your opponent has just K-Q, your winning chances are only 8.8 percent. Give him the nuts (a set of queens), and you’re looking at 0.1 percent. Clearly, a bad call on the flop can be a massive mistake, even when you’re getting a good price.

Let’s look at ranges. Take the Q-7-4 rainbow flop I just mentioned. If you have two jacks, and bet and get raised, what might your opponent have? A-Q, K-Q, Q-J, certainly, and any of the sets, as well. Might he also have two tens, A-7 suited, 6-5 suited, or the other two jacks? If so, your jacks have 26 percent equity, and you’d have to call, getting 3-1 or better. In fact, you’d have 17 percent equity with pocket eights, and would be stuck calling, getting 5-1. As long as you’re betting middle pair, a draw, or overcards, and not some total garbage, you’ll pretty much always be priced in, getting 5-1.

It just so happens that this 5-1 also becomes a convenient guideline. If your opponent has only a pot-sized stack in front of him, you know that you’ll be committed if you make a bet of half the pot or more. It’s not quite as nice as the preflop guideline, but it’s definitely worth remembering when facing a short stack after the flop.

Turn and river commitment decisions are much more about your read. By the turn, you almost never have the odds to draw if you’re behind, and on the river, you obviously have either 0 percent, 50 percent, or 100 percent equity against your opponent’s hand (assuming that it’s heads up). If you’re a great reader, you can fold when getting 500-1 if you’re sure that you’re dead on the end (though I wouldn’t recommend it)! On the later streets, you just have to determine how often you think you have the best hand, and act accordingly.

When players ask me, “Am I committed here?” it’s often the case that they should’ve avoided putting so much money into the pot with a questionable hand in the first place. That said, I hope that these guidelines give you a better framework for determining when you might be pot-committed and when you might be able to get away from a hand.

Matt Matros is the author of The Making of a Poker Player, which is available online at www.CardPlayer.com. He is also a featured coach for stoxpoker.com.