Lessons With Jeff Shulman — Part III

In my last two columns, I revealed my “lesson plan” for Jeff Shulman at the World Series of Poker “November Nine” final table. Basically — with Shulman having 20 million in chips, and the blinds at 120,000-240,000 with a 20,000 ante — I recommended extremely tight play, with opening bets of five times the big blind when Shulman did enter a pot. Barry Shulman, Jeff’s father, had just won the World Series of Poker Europe championship by utilizing an extremely tight strategy, and the three of us agreed that this was the best way to play. By the way, I correctly predicted that Phil Ivey would also utilize an extremely tight strategy. I mean, why wouldn’t he? Why gamble? Shulman and Ivey were the best players, so why not be patient and wait for a great situation to present itself? Why not wait for the amateurs to melt, blow up, and give it away? Massive pressure — including making history, playing on ESPN _and the world stage, and playing for millions of dollars — can cause a lot of self-destruction at a _WSOP main-event final table.

With the blinds at 200,000-400,000, Shulman opened for 1.75 million from the button with 9-9, and Ivey moved all in from the big blind for 6.9 million more. Shulman had started the hand with 15.8 million, and he counted out the 6.9 million and hovered for a full minute. A little history: Shulman had folded a bunch of times on the button when it was Ivey’s big blind. Now that Shulman finally had raised, he assumed that Ivey knew that he had at least a semi-strong hand. While doing the live Internet broadcast, I said, “Ivey doesn’t look super strong; I mean, I think he would move all in with A-9 offsuit here. Thus, Jeff should call with A-Q, and maybe even A-J.” Shulman folded his 9-9, and the word spread that Ivey had K-Q (which was true).

Although many great players like Barry Greenstein, Mike “The Mouth” Matusow, and Howard “The Professor” Lederer spoke out, saying that they thought it was a clear call with 9-9, I am 100 percent on Shulman’s side, and in fact, I think it was a clear fold! I like looking at the whole story when I make these decisions. Did 9-9 figure to be good? Yes. Would I make that call in a cash game? Yes. So, the beginning of the story suggests that it was not a good fold. But it was a fold that left Shulman with 14 million, which was plenty of chips to play with, considering the deep structure in place at the final table. It was a chip stack that he could use to put himself in a better situation against weaker players. A call, however, would leave Shulman with either 7 million or 25 million; 7 million would really cripple him and put him in jeopardy, and probably force him to play some big pots with some weaker holdings. I love the fold, because I love to protect my chips. Fold the 9-9, let some time pass, let some other players get eliminated, and then put your chips all in when you have way the best of it and there are only four or five players remaining. I factor in these things when I make a big laydown. And it must be told that Shulman followed his plan precisely, and found himself all in a few hours later with A-K against Joe Cada’s A-J. One all-in pot in 10 hours of play — that, my friends, is risk-free poker!

One hour after his all in, when they were down to five-handed, Shulman had Cada all in with his J-J against Cada’s 3-3. Cada outdrew him, but if Shulman’s pocket jacks had held up (they were more than a 4-1 favorite over Cada’s 3-3), Shulman would have been four-handed with more than 30 million in chips! Do I like the fold of 9-9? Yes, especially when the rest of the story went as it did. Did Shulman deserve better? Yes, he did.

In my next column, I’ll discuss an even more controversial fold that Shulman made with A-K preflop.

Learn more about Phil by going to his website, www.PhilHellmuth.com, and visit his webstore at www.PokerBrat.com.