‘Easy’ Things to Do to Win at Poker — Part IX

This series of columns focuses on things that you can do at the table to improve your decision-making. I have been discussing each item on the list below, extracted from my book Advanced Limit Hold’em Strategy.

• Pay more attention
• Select the best games
• Learn how your opponents play
• Study betting patterns
• Analyze every situation
• Plan in advance
• Play focused on the game
• Count the pot
• Compute the odds
• Figure out how the play might go
• Estimate what your opponents think you hold and how you should respond
• Then, make a decision

In my last column, I discussed computing the odds (all of the columns in this series are available at www.CardPlayer.com). This column will discuss figuring out how the play might go.

Figure out how the play might go: How many times have you seen something like this? The flop hits, early-position Player A bets, Player B calls, and Player C raises. Now, Player A three-bets and Player B mucks his hand. Player B was almost certainly right to fold here, but equally, he was almost certainly wrong to call.

Before the flop, the vast majority of players understand position. Textbooks drill into them the value of position and provide hand charts to assist them in deciding which hands they should play from various positions. Unfortunately, after the flop, they are pretty much on their own.

When someone on your right bets, whether on the flop or the turn, and there are players yet to act behind you, you are out of position. Being out of position, you need a strong hand to continue, because you have no idea of how the play might go. In the example above, Player C and others might have called or folded, and Player B could have gotten away with his bad call. But that means Player B was gambling instead of playing percentages and trying to make decisions that had a positive expected value. He was hoping that things would go his way, and “hoping” is losing poker.

Do not assume the best case: Whenever you are faced with a decision in a multiway pot, you must consider more than pot odds. Indeed, you must even consider something more than implied odds (the money that you might win if you make your hand and others pay you off). You also must consider the chances that you will face raises, as those raises will destroy your proper odds.

Of course, if you call with correct odds and then there is a raise, you may well be correct to call again, this time with improved odds. However, two rights in this case often make a wrong. Let’s look at an example:

You hold the 8 7 in the big blind. A middle-position player open-raises and two others call, including the small blind. You call, as well, and four of you see the flop of A 9 5. The small blind now bets, and it is your turn. You have a gutshot-straight draw, and there are no real threats on the board. Your odds of making it are roughly 11-1 against. However, there are now nine bets in the pot, and although you are not getting exactly the correct current odds, your implied odds justify making the call. The preflop raiser raises, the next player folds, and the small blind calls. Now there are 13 bets in the pot, and it costs you only one more, so you call again.

Let’s look at what actually happened. You put in two bets to win 12. You did it “on the installment plan,” but if you had acted after all of the action was completed, you would have seen eight bets preflop, and two bets from each remaining competitor. At only 6-1, you would have folded. While each call seemed right, the first one was wrong because of the chance of a raise.

Some might say that the raise was unlucky. Sometimes you would not face a raise here, and the call would be OK. This is true, but to make a call with marginal odds (as in the example), you have to be right almost every time. If you are right half the time and wrong half the time (or even considerably less), you are guaranteed to be a long-term loser. The wins cannot compensate for the extra bets lost.

Trapping unaware players: When the player on your right bets, it does not matter much if you are the big blind or the button. If there are still players left to act, even if they have already checked, you risk facing one or more raises.

But what if you are first to act? Betting into a field of players almost begs for a raise (which is one reason that the small blind’s bet in the example was so dangerous). It generally requires a huge hand or a very big draw. Some players do not understand this, and blithely call a bet from their right if they have any sort of hand or draw. Betting to trap these players is a key reason to bet early, rather than “check to the raiser.” Opponents who do not understand the risks they are taking by calling out of position in a multiway pot are a significant source of profit. If you eliminate these players by check-raising instead of betting into them to gain their incorrect calls, you may be losing money in the long term in a way that you will never see.

On the river: A different example of figuring out how the play might go and reacting to it occurs on the river. You have a flush draw, and are heads up on the turn with a player who raised preflop and bet the flop and the turn. Now, you make your flush on the river. Too many players check here, expecting the bettor to keep betting and enable them to check-raise. Much of the time, he does not bet, though, either because he fears the flush or because he was betting a hand that was OK but not great, and he now just wants to see a showdown.

Expect the check behind you. When you make your hand, bet! The number of crying calls that you will get is far greater than the extra bets you will gain by the other guy betting and then calling your check-raise. Check-raising is more fun; betting makes the money. As an added benefit, if opponents realize that you bet your hands, they may start folding on the river, enabling you to make an occasional successful bluff.

Part of your decision-making is anticipating future actions, and exploiting those players who do not do so. Keep this in mind as you play.

In my next column, I will discuss deciding what your opponent thinks you have and how to respond to that.

Barry Tanenbaum is the author of Advanced Limit Hold’em Strategy, and collaborator on Limit Hold’em: Winning Short-Handed Strategies. Barry offers private lessons tailored to the individual student. Please see his website, www.barrytanenbaum.com, or write to him at [email protected].