Playing the Data

The key to decision-making is having good data. In poker, you have a continuous data stream in the form of the tendencies, behaviors, moods, and other variables displayed by and affecting your opponents. The key element of making plays is modifying your game to how your opponents play, taking advantage of any tendencies or weaknesses you might find.

Most people have a playing style; they call, raise, or fold too much, bluff too much, try to run over the game too much, pay off too often or not enough, play too many or not enough hands, and so on. The trick is to encourage your opponents to make more of the kinds of mistakes that they’re going to make anyway. Trap them into being themselves. Always note, however, that external and situational variables often cause them to deviate from their tendencies. You must continuously maintain your awareness.

I make my poker decisions one at a time, based on the situation that I’m facing with my current read. Of course, neither my read nor my decision is always right.

I was playing nine-handed $30-$60 limit hold’em at Bellagio, and a super-aggressive player opened the pot with a raise from early position. It was folded around to me in the small blind, and I had the A K.

My most likely play here would be to three-bet. You are just in such good shape from an expectation standpoint when you get it heads up against someone with a weaker ace. That said, when I’m out of position against an aggressive player with a wide range of hands who’s difficult to read, much of that value is lost. There’s value in letting him overplay his hand. I looked to the big blind to see if he would give any indication of whether he was calling or folding, and received no read from him. Getting 5-1 on a call, it probably was correct for the big blind to call — and you want to prevent your opponent from making correct calls if you can do so without giving up equity.

My thoughts regarding the hand were split. Some judgments told me to raise, while others told me to call and trap. I searched my mind for any other factors that might sway my decision. The big blind played his hands poorly, and even if I let him make a correct call preflop, I might gain that lost edge back later in the hand if he made mistakes, which I felt was likely. That factor made my decision. I called, as did the big blind. We took the flop off three-handed.

I disliked the flop, Q 9 2. Much of the raiser’s range of hands hit that board in some manner or another, by either hitting the queen, already holding a pair, or having some sort of straight draw. And I also had to put the big blind’s range into the equation. I checked, knowing the super-aggressive player would bet, and resigned myself to taking one off and being done with my hand unless I either observed something or hit a card to change my mind. The big blind checked behind me, and Mr. Aggressive fired into the pot. I called, as did the big blind.

The turn card was the 4. I checked, the big blind checked, and Mr. Aggressive knuckled. We got a free card, a two-for-one special. I rooted for an ace or king, but also thought there was some chance that my hand was good as it stood.

The river brought the J♦. So, A-J and any straight draw just beat me. I was questioning how I had played my hand as I checked, ready to fold if someone bet. They both checked, and I turned my hand up. The big blind turned over K-2 offsuit, for a pair of deuces, and Mr. Aggressive mucked.

My heart sank. I would have won the pot had I forced out the big blind. Even though he played poorly, he was not going to call three bets with K-2 offsuit. That said, I am an experienced enough poker player to know that just because I would have won the pot by playing my hand differently, it doesn’t mean that I made a mistake by playing my hand the way that I did.

Results-oriented players are lifetime losers at the game. But, of course, that doesn’t mean that I didn’t make a mistake, either.

I reviewed my thoughts. I still am not sure what Mr. Aggressive held. He either was making some sort of deception play with medium or low suited connectors, or held A-10, likely suited, or maybe A-K, which was not very likely since I held A-K and the big blind also held a king. Since it was much more likely that he held big cards that hit a piece of the flop, I felt that playing my hand passively after the flop was justified and correct, even though I probably would have won the pot by playing it aggressively.

That said, was the preflop flat-call correct? In hindsight, it sure doesn’t appear so, as it cost me the pot. But it could have turned out in other ways; a king could have come and the big blind would have given me action that I wouldn’t otherwise have received, and I could have been in bad shape to Mr. Aggressive preflop. Even if he held an underpair, being out of position with A-K against such an aggressive, hard-to-read opponent who holds an underpair doesn’t play well, either.

I founded my decisions on my opponents’ tendencies — aggression and poor decision-making. In this particular scenario, the boardcards weren’t good for me. I think the play of flat-calling preflop was close from an expectation standpoint, and I know that as long as it was close, I didn’t give up too much in the way of expectation. But, of course, as I watched the big blind stack the pot, it didn’t appear that way.

Longtime poker pro and author Roy Cooke’s Card Player column has appeared since 1992. A successful Las Vegas real estate broker since 1990, his website is www.roycooke.com. Should you wish to inquire regarding real-estate matters — including purchase, sale, or mortgage — his phone number is (702) 396-6575. Roy’s longtime collaborator John Bond’s website is www.johnbondwriting.com.