Flop Play After You Raised Preflop

Playing $30-$60 limit hold’em at Bellagio, I held red kings in middle position. I open-raised, and only the blinds, both professional players, called. We saw a flop of 10 9 8. Both blinds checked to me, and I checked, as well (we will get back to this in a moment). The turn was the 8.

Now, the small blind bet and the big blind called. I elected to raise and, somewhat surprisingly, both opponents folded. Naturally, I was pleased with the result, but that does not make my play correct. Let’s examine it.

The case for betting: The preflop raise was fine, so the bone of contention will be my checking the flop. Nearly all players with K-K would bet the flop. Here’s why:

• They probably have the best hand.
• They do not want to give a free card.
• They always bet, so that opponents will have a hard time reading their hand.
• They may win the pot on this round.

They probably have the best hand: It is nice to have the best hand, but in itself, it is not a great reason to bet. The real questions to ask are:

1. What is the likelihood that they will have the best hand when the hand is over?
2. What is the best way to optimize their winnings and minimize any potential losses?
3. Is there a way to proceed that will simplify the decision-making process, which is the key to long-term winning?

This is not to say that betting with the best hand is wrong, but there may be deeper strategic alternatives that occasionally may prove to be more profitable.

They do not want to give a free card: No one wants to give a free card, but we need to look more carefully at what a free card means. Giving a free card to an opponent is disastrous only if he would have folded had you bet, and he then makes a hand that can beat yours. On this board, the most dangerous free card would be an ace in an opponent’s hand that he may fold to a bet. If you check and an ace comes, an opponent has one, and he would have folded to a bet, you have lost a pot that you would have won. This is not a likely parlay, but the risk exists. What if an opponent holds a hand like 3-3? Few opponents would fold this hand to a single bet, preferring to hope that you have an A-K type of hand and they are in the lead.

Giving a “free” card to such a holding costs a fraction of a bet over charging him for a flop call, but would not cost you the pot. There are other hands that opponents can hold where checking will cost a fraction of a bet over time. These may be balanced by the bets that could be lost if you bet when you are behind. Nevertheless, there are dangerous holdings that opponents may fold, and that would be a good reason to bet.

They always bet, so that opponents will have a hard time reading their hand: Many players actually do this. No matter how slim their chances to win the pot may be, if they raised preflop and everyone checks to them, they bet. I would argue that it is costly to bet when your chances to win are slim, at best, and it is almost certainly a negative expected-value play, so auto-betting is not a winning policy. However, if you are going to check some of your worst hands, you will, for balance, also occasionally have to check some of your better ones.

Interestingly, there are players who bet every time unless they actually hit a big hand. Then, they “cleverly” check. Unaware players may believe that the checkers are afraid of something, but unaware players tend to play poorly anyway. Savvy players tend to immediately recognize these unexpected checks as being dangerous, and they proceed with extreme caution. As always, balance is the key.

They may win the pot on this round: Oftentimes, it is correct to bet if you can win the pot now, as opposed to checking and possibly losing it later. Exceptions exist for tiny pots, but pretty much any raised pot qualifies as one worth winning immediately. However, you also have to assess your chances of actually winning. With respect to the hand in question, the flop has a great chance of giving at least one of my two opponents a good to excellent draw, if not a better hand than I have. This factor diminishes the chances that a bet will win it. If a bet will not win the pot immediately, strategic considerations like the ones addressed above take precedence.

The case for checking: Let’s look at an extreme example. After three limpers, you raise with black aces from the cutoff, and the blinds and all of the limpers call. The flop is Q 7 3. Everyone checks to you. The chances that not one of your five opponents holds a heart are miniscule, so if a heart comes on the turn, you are doomed. Even though you probably have the best hand right now, the best play is to check. If a heart does come, you can quietly fold and save the bet. If a heart does not come, perhaps someone will bet into you and you can raise. Now, you are presenting opponents with a double big bet with only one card to come, reducing their odds and possibly forcing them out with weak flush draws.

If you accept this principle, you can apply it to my check on the flop in the K K hand. First, the flop is dangerous, especially with the callers being professionals who figure to have real hands with their calls. Many real hands fit nicely with this flop.

Second, if one of them check-raises the flop, I will not be able to tell if it is with a fancy draw, a good hand worse than mine, or a good hand better than mine. This makes my decision-making process on the flop more difficult.

Third, if a non-threatening card comes on the turn, I can raise with what figures to be the best hand and make them pay dearly for their draws. If a really bad card comes, like the 7, I can call or fold, depending on the action. Opponents’ raises on the turn are more reliable indicators of their hand strength than similar raises on the flop. Finally, if I see substantial raising or resistance on the turn, I will be better able to narrow down their range of hands, and potentially fold if I am drawing nearly dead.

Conclusion: This philosophy of checking fairly dangerous flops when I hold a good but not fitting hand may not appeal to you. Whether or not I made the right decision here, the reasons for my play were thought out very well.

Barry Tanenbaum is the author of Advanced Limit Hold’em Strategy, and collaborator on Limit Hold’em: Winning Short-Handed Strategies. Barry offers private lessons tailored to the individual student. Please see his website, www.barrytanenbaum.com, or write to him at [email protected].