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Wrong, But Right

by Roy Cooke |  Published: Mar 06, 2013

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Roy CookePlaying poker well requires pricing your plays. Whether you are contemplating calling to draw, paying off an opponent who may be bluffing, or think you have the best hand, you need to evaluate your chances of winning to the risk of the line of play you’re taking and the amount you may win or lose. In short, what are your effective odds for the current situation?

It was about 1 p.m., I was in the $20-$40 limit hold’em game, waiting for the second $40-$80 to start at the Bellagio. I’d been playing about an hour, caught a run of good cards and was up about a thousand, a significant rush for an hour of $20-$40. I’d particularly beat up one tourist on my left who seemed to try to play well, but didn’t really understand the game. He played too many hands and played them weak-tight. Additionally, I’d raised a couple of draws against him and connected on them. He didn’t understand semi-bluffing and was dazed and confused, but still challenging me. And looking for revenge.

The field folded to me on the button. Holding JClub Suit 10Heart Suit, I hit it a lick, hoping to take the blinds uncontested, but knowing that with two playful opponents posting, I was highly likely to get called. And they both called.

The flop came down 10Spade Suit 4Spade Suit 3Heart Suit. Mr. Trying led, Mr. Loose-Big Blind called and I contemplated my choices. Mr. Trying had, well he’d been trying to play solid so far and was overly tight in his betting strategies. I put him on a hand, maybe top pair, a small set or maybe a flush draw. And if he had a non-drawing hand, my holding was likely in trouble. Yeah, I had top pair, but my kicker was poor, and Mr. Loose-Big Blind had to have some semblance of a hand, further reducing my chances of winning. I decided to flat call and see what developed on the turn. By knowing the turn card and the turn actions of both of my opponents I could make a better informed decision, possibly making a strong laydown or even making a high expected value (EV) turn raise should I read my tens as being good.

The turn card was a frightening one, the 7Spade Suit, filling both the straight and flush draws. Mr. Trying fired once again; Mr. Loose-Big Blind called again. Now, there wasn’t much I could beat. If Mr. Trying had led with a flush draw, he just got there. If he had a ten, it was unlikely I held the best kicker. And Mr. Loose-Big Blind didn’t help my chances any in the event I did have the best hand. I tossed my hand into the muck feeling good about getting away from what I thought was a loser.
Terry, the dealer, rivered the JDiamond Suit. “Damn” I thought, now I beat all single pairs either of my opponents might hold. I was further annoyed when both Mr. Trying and Mr. Loose-Big Blind checked their hands.

To my surprise, Mr. Trying turned over the ASpade Suit 4Heart Suit, having flopped second pair with a backdoor flush draw with the ASpade Suit, turning the nut-flush draw and firing again. Mr. Loose-Big Blind turned over the 5Heart Suit 5Spade Suit having taken off the flop with two fives, turning a gutshot draw and calling again. Not only had I been way ahead when I mucked the turn, but to add insult to injury, I had improved my hand with the JDiamond Suit too!

Sitting there with egg on my face, Terry stated “You look deep in thought” after pushing the pot to Mr. Loose-Big Blind. And she was right! I was deeply questioning the wisdom of my turn decision. Had I made a bad laydown?

I reviewed my thinking. I was getting $260-$40 on the turn call, though calling then would increase my propensity to call on the river. Doing rough justice estimating the effective pricing, was I one in six to win the pot on the turn?

The turn card being a spade and the fact that Mr. Trying led again after leading the flop gave me ample reasons to believe I was beat. Not prone to bluff or bet light, almost all of his potential range beat me with some of it having me drawing dead. Even if my hand was good on the turn, which it wouldn’t be in many situations, I had lots of ways to lose it on the river had a different card came.

My thinking made sense to me, even in hindsight after knowing the decision was effectively wrong based on my opponents’ holdings. There were just too many ways I could have been beat or gotten beat. I review my decisions in hindsight, not by whether they are right or wrong based on what card(s) came or the holdings of my opponents, but on the information I had available at my decision point.

In this case, my opponents happened to be holding hands that I could beat, though they were much more likely to hold hands that I couldn’t beat. That fact and the fact that the pot was not laying me a large enough price based on their potential hand ranges to justify the call, made me feel my decision was right when I made it. Yeah, it was to be the wrong effective decision because my opponents happened to hold hands in their potential range that I could beat. But that really doesn’t matter. In poker your job is to make better overall decisions than your opponents. If you’re successful, their chips will migrate to you.

And if you never lay down the best hand, you’re calling too loosely. If a pot is laying you 5-to-1 on a call and your winning percentage is ten percent, you have made an incorrect call. It’s better to fold even though you will be laying down the best hand ten percent of the time. You’ll do better in the long run saving those calls and losing the occasional pot. ♠

Roy Cooke played poker professionally for 16 years prior to becoming a successful Las Vegas Real Estate Broker/Salesman in 1989. Should you wish to any information about Real Estate matters-including purchase, sale or mortgage his office number is 702-396-6575 or Roy’s e-mail is [email protected]. His website is www.roycooke.com. You can also find him on Facebook or follow him on Twitter @RealRoyCooke.