Isolation in a Lowball Killed Pot

YACHT-x is a yearly Bay Area tournament, Yet Another Cool Hold'em Tournament, among RGPers. It's a small tournament, $40 buy-in, no rebuys, no-limit hold'em, with a flat payout structure. The tournament is organized by Patrick Milligan, developer of the Oakleaf Tournament Timer, a product used by many cardrooms, and, of course, in this tournament. YACHT-6 took place recently with 31 participants and it paid five places.

As players busted out, ring games started up, including a baby pot-limit game, small-limit C.H.O.R.S.E.L (Chowaha, limit hold'em, Omaha eight-or-better, razz, seven-card stud, seven-card stud eight-or-better, and lowball), and $6-limit lowball.

Of course, I played in the lowball game. The blinds in this game were $1 on the button, $2 in the middle blind, and $3 in the big blind. It was Northern California-style ace-to-five lowball, with the bring-in always being twice the size of the big blind, and all bets before and after the draw in multiples of $6, which is why this game is also called single-limit lowball, as opposed to Southern California's two-tiered double-limit lowball, in which players can choose to open for the size of the blind (gypsy in or limp) or come in for a raise. The limit was $6, unless someone killed the pot. In a $6 single-limit game, if a player likes his first two cards, he can put $6 into the pot after seeing only those first two cards, and kill the pot. This doubles the stakes to $12 for that one hand, with betting in increments of $12 before and after the draw. Killing – also known as overblinding – is not like posting in other games. Before the draw, the player who killed the pot does not act in order. The play would start to the left of the big blind. If the overblinder had killed from a middle position, the action would temporarily skip him. Players would act in turn up to the button. After the button acted, the small blind and the big blind would act. Only then would the action finally return to the overblinder. If anyone raised, players would come back in in the same order they had originally come in. When the action got to the overblinder, it would cost him $6 less to call than anyone else, because he already had $6 in the pot. This acting last before the draw is cleverly called last action, and is the reason why action players like to kill pots when their first two cards are good. They get to see what everyone else does, and then if they end up with four or even five good cards, can raise after everyone else has acted. Of course, what often happens is that the overblinder gets only one more good card, and usually puts in the extra $6 to draw two cards, since he's getting good odds on that extra half a bet. But he still ends up putting in $12 on a hand with which he might not have put in $12 had he seen all five of his cards first. That's the downside of killing. The upside is that the pots are bigger and the overblinder has that last-action advantage. When a player is on a rush and he kills lots of pots, his stack can grow quickly.

An interesting situation came up that applies in cardroom lowball just as much as it did to our game. Interestingly, the hand in question plays completely different in most Southern California games.

Jimmy started out with a nice rush, winning lots of pots early, and tripled his initial $100 buy-in. As is often the case with an early rush, this one came to an end, and Jimmy lost with lots of second-best hands and quit getting away with the bluffs that had worked so well before. He was back down to $18 in chips when the following hand came up.

The button was on my left. Abner apparently liked his first two cards and killed the pot. This meant the betting would be $12 limit and he would act last before the draw. The small and big blind would have to act on their hands before Abner did. Jimmy, one to my right, opened. I had nothing, and folded. The small blind folded, and Patrick, in the big blind, thought for a while. Patrick has not played much cardroom lowball. He hosts a small weekly limit game in which lowball is rarely played. Perhaps once or twice a year he has an all-draw game, in which lowball, high draw, and high-low draw are played. Patrick is learning, and when I get invited to these games, the understanding is that I will answer questions about specific hands. That agreement was in force in this game, too. Patrick finally indicated that he was folding, and threw his cards to me, saying that he wanted to ask advice about the hand. "I'll tell you after this hand is over," I said, but I was pretty sure that what I would see would fall into one of three categories:

1. A rough one-card draw

2. A good two-card draw

3. A pat 10

The cards that Patrick had folded were 8-7-6-joker. I said, "I know that you were thinking about playing. What I would have done is an advanced play, and something you probably didn't consider. I would have raised." Patrick agreed that that hadn't been among the options he had weighed.

Here's why I would have made that play:

Jimmy had just lost a few close pots, and looked like he might be steaming. Patrick's hand had a good chance of already being better than Jimmy's. When you likely have the best hand in lowball, that's a good time to raise. But Patrick's hand was not great, and he would be happiest to play it just with Jimmy. Jimmy had only $6 left after coming in for $12. Even if he beat Patrick, it would not cost much, since Jimmy had only half a bet left. Patrick already had $6 invested in this pot. If he just called, Abner would call with any good two-card draw and many rough one-card draws. With most of those hands, though, Abner would not call for a raise. And even if Abner had a better draw than Patrick, he likely would only call, knowing that Patrick played a fairly solid game. In this situation, Patrick would get hurt only if Abner had a pat hand better than a rough 8 – and that was a chance worth taking, since the odds against that were pretty high. Even starting with two good cards, a pat hand was still pretty hard to come by, at least 16-to-1 against. If Abner did have a better draw, Patrick still could draw out, with odds against him of probably not much worse than 11-to-9. The dead money in the pot would give him positive expected value. But what Patrick should most want is for Abner to fold. Then, even if Jimmy had a better draw, the dead money (Abner's $6 blind) would still make the play worthwhile.

But Patrick did not play, and Abner called. I was not at all surprised that Jimmy drew two cards. Abner did, also. Jimmy bet his last $6, which turned out to be a desperation play, because he paired deuces. Abner had an easy call with a two-card 9. But Abner definitely would not have played that two-card draw had Patrick raised. You don't need to play results to know you have made the right play, but, as it turned out, Patrick would have won the hand. The cards would have come either 2-K, making Patrick's 8 and giving Jimmy no better than a king, or K-2, giving Patrick a king high and pairing Jimmy.

This situation differs in Southern California, depending on the club. In some clubs, players can kill the pot after looking at three cards. In other clubs (one, primarily), although the game is double limit, players can kill the pot only after looking at two cards. Where the look-at-two-and-kill rule is in force, Patrick would play the hand as described here. For example, $15-$30 is a common limit. If Abner had killed the pot on the blind after seeing two cards, making the game $30-$60 for this one deal, perhaps Jimmy would have $45. He would have tripled his stack earlier and then slowly dropped back down, just as described in the YACHT game. He might have limped for $30. Patrick, in the big blind, would raise. Now, it would be easier for Abner to call. He would have to put in an amount equal to the size of his blind instead of three times its size, as in the Northern California game. Nonetheless, he likely would not come in with a rough draw. He might call with a two-card draw, but that would be fine for Patrick, because Patrick would have the best of it.

Where the look-at-two-and-kill rule is in force, Patrick should not play the hand, even though he could put Jimmy all in and, if Abner did not call, there would be dead money in the pot. The reason is, having seen three good cards, Abner would need to have two bricks in his hand not to play. That is, all Abner would need would be at least one good card out of two to have a hand better than Patrick's. There's a lot of difference between needing only at least one good card out of two as opposed to at least two out of three. With two good cards, he certainly would reraise, and Patrick would be in the very bad situation of putting in three bets to be drawing dead. With one good card, many action players would still put in a third bet, and Patrick would then be in the almost as bad situation of putting in three bets to be drawing to a much worse hand than Abner's. I won't show the math here, but Abner would have at least one good card approximately two-thirds of the time. (If you include that he would probably also play many nines pat, that increases his chances.) Patrick would not want to be offering Abner odds of greater than 5-to-1 to call in a situation in which Abner was a 2-to-1 favorite.

But in Northern California, the proper play in this exact situation is to raise. If Jimmy has a lot more chips and is less likely to be steaming, throwing the hand away without even calling is not an unreasonable option. Just calling is weak, because it lets Abner in with two-card draws and rough draws, and, if Abner does raise, he undoubtedly has the best of it. Jimmy might reraise, forcing Patrick out, or he might call, and Patrick would have to call with a hand that is likely the worst of the three. That's why I said in this exact situation.