Catch My Card and Muck?

We all have seen hands in which people get lucky and unlucky on the same card. They are hoping for a certain card, it comes, and they gleefully bet out, only to discover that the card they thought they wanted simply cost them extra money. If only they did not catch their card, they would have been a lot better off.

Sometimes, then, we need to determine that our dream card is really a nightmare before we commit a lot of money. I had a chance to do it recently, but did not follow through, even though I suspected I was in trouble. Follow along and see if you would have made the winning play.

Playing $30-$60 hold'em at Bellagio, I picked up the A K three off the button. A young player (YP) in front of me raised. We had not played together before, but in the hour or so we had spent at the table, I categorized him as very solid. What now?

I will not lay down A-K in limit hold'em preflop unless I know a player raises only with A-A or K-K, and very few people play like that. I needed to decide between calling and raising. A call could easily attract several more players, which I did not want, as my hand plays better heads up. A reraise should thin the field, and usually create the desired two-player result. I went ahead and made it three bets.

My aggression did not have the desired outcome, however, as both the button and the big blind called. YP also called, and the four of us took the flop of 10 4 2 – not my idea of a great flop for my hand.

A-K When the Flop Misses: Both the blind and YP checked to me. I know lots of players who bet here, since they put in three bets and would like to try to take control of the hand, but I am not one of them. First, I have three opponents, which is far too many to hope that my A-K will be good at the river unimproved. Second, the pot is large, and everyone is getting at least 13-1 to call my bet. Third, these are not random hands, because one player raised preflop and two called three bets to see the flop. They must have something. I understand the argument that betting here might get a hand like A-Q to fold, therefore increasing my chances of winning, but I assume I must improve to win anyway, so I do not worry about that. Checking here is certainly indicated, and that is what I did. In reality, my plan was to give up at the earliest opportunity, since I really had hoped for an ace or king on the flop and had missed.

To my surprise, the button also checked. While I was wondering what he could have to call three bets cold and then check the flop, the dealer burned and turned the K. That was about as good a card as I could hope for, and I was getting ready to bet as soon as they all checked to me again.

They were not reading from the same playbook, though, and before it got to me, the big blind had bet and YP had raised! What was going on here? The raise had me very worried. While I was a bit concerned about the lead bet, as well, this bettor was not a very insightful player, in my opinion, and could have been betting a number of different hands, most of which were worse than mine. YP, on the other hand, had just raised from a very vulnerable position, and ought to have tremendous strength.

Analyzing the Turn: Let's look at why he should be so strong. He must, of course, ask himself what everyone is holding, but in particular, he has to be concerned about what my hand could be. I three-bet before the flop, and then checked the 10-high board. He should consider that for my actions, I need either a very strong hand (like pocket tens) or a hand like A-K. In either case, he should be very wary of raising into such probable strength.

Now, the question for me was, "Did he in fact do this analysis, and therefore must have a hand that can beat my A-K?" If I thought he had, I should throw away my hand. If not, I have to reraise. If there were only two of us, I could simply call him down if I did not want to fold. However, we are not alone, and the other two players had to enter into my thinking. I could not afford to simply call the raise and give them decent pot odds to draw out on me.

For example, whatever hand the big blind holds, he must have outs to my one-pair hand. If I call, there will be 11 big bets in the pot and he will therefore be getting 11-1 on his call, which is enough to try to make two pair with, say, K-Q. If I reraise, he will be getting only 6-1 (there will be 12 big bets in the pot, but he will need to call at least two more), and will have to fold or make a huge error.

I elected to reraise, and it had the desired effect of knocking out both the button and the big blind. Unfortunately, it also had the undesired effect of allowing YP to make it four bets. There were now 14 big bets in the pot, making it well worth winning. The question was: Did I have a chance to win it? I could think of only three hands that YP could reasonably hold for this sequence: A-A, K-K, and 10-10. Pocket kings was highly unlikely, because there were only two unaccounted for, and the lead bet by the big blind indicated he probably had a king. If YP had a set of tens, I was drawing dead. If he had pocket aces, I had either one or two outs, depending on whether my read of the big blind was accurate.

I suppose there was some chance that YP held A-K, as I did, and did not read my hand as possibly being dangerous to him. If that were true, I could call the turn and the river, and hope to split the pot. In other words, I would have to put in two more bets, hoping to win half of the 14 now in there. I must win the seven bets more than two-sevenths (28.6 percent) of the time for this to happen. If I thought there was better than a 28.6 percent chance that YP had the same hand I did, I should go ahead and call him. Unless I was really way off in my assessment of the situation, though, I had almost no chance to win and less than a 10 percent chance to tie. Consequently, I folded.

Afterthoughts: What a strange hand this was for me. I three-bet before the flop, checked on the flop, three-bet on the turn, and then folded top pair, top kicker for one additional bet. From a spectator's perspective, it must have seemed that I had no real plan for the hand. In all fairness, I can recall very few hands in which I have seen a player make it three bets on the turn and fold to the fourth bet. Multiway pots sometimes force us to make plays we wish we did not have to make, and would not make in a heads-up situation, but I thought this was a very unusual hand.

There are two other things to add in closing. First, YP told me after the hand that he had pocket aces. He did not show them, and anyone can say they have anything (and I sometimes do, as well), but he seemed sincere. Who knows?

Second, I posted this hand as a problem on UnitedPokerForum.com, asking what to do on the turn after YP's raise made it two bets to me. A frequent contributor by the name of "Angel" immediately replied that I should have thrown the A-K away for the two bets. That was a terrific answer, and would have saved me a lot of money, had I thought to do it at the table.