Raise or Fold Situations

One of the most confusing things for me to grasp as a beginning player was the concept of "raise or fold" situations. It seemed to me that if you could raise or fold, then surely calling would be a terrific compromise. I was always a compromising sort of person.

I have since learned to think of the situation as similar to deciding what to do on a busy street. You can drive east, or you can drive west. Parking in the center is not a useful compromise. In fact, it is likely to get you hurt.

Despite being an extremely imperfect analogy, it helps me focus on the concept. And the concept explains why you will see so many players you respect doing a lot more raising or folding than calling.

Certainly, calling has a significant place in poker. So, I will try here to define how to recognize at least the most common raise or fold situations. The specific criteria are:

• The pot must be multiway. There are no raise or fold situations in heads-up hands. With no players to act behind you, you can select from any action you think will give you the best chance. For example, if you think your opponent is bluffing, you can simply call and hope he bluffs off some more money. With players drawing to beat you also in the hand, you cannot simply play the bluffer, but must raise to reduce the odds for the drawing players.

• There must be a bet before you. (Obviously, you cannot raise or fold unless there is a bet, but I like to be comprehensive.)

• There must be no intervening callers. You are next to act after the bet. If there is an intervening caller, and you believe all of the other criteria are met, you still might decide that this is a raise or fold situation, but it is not mandatory.

• You must have reason to believe you have the best hand, or are choosing to represent the best hand. If you have a draw, raising will reduce your pot odds both by having you put more money in the pot and by eliminating some players who could help increase your odds.

• There must be players behind you who could improve to make hands that could beat yours. If you hold an unbeatable hand, there is no requirement to raise (and folding would be a very bad idea).

The general concept here is, if there is a bet and you hold (or want to represent) a made hand, you do not want to call if your made hand is second best, particularly as there may still be raises behind you. You would be out of position with respect to the rest of the field, and thus would need to play more tightly.

On the other hand, if you think your hand might be the best, calling simply invites people to trail along inexpensively to try to beat you.

This concept sometimes requires some fine judgment on your part, but if you think of these situations in the terms I set out, your judgment will improve. You will be folding more and therefore seeing some pots you might have won go to other people, but generally you will be saving money in the long run.

A specific situation: In a recent Bellagio $30-$60 game, I got a free play in the big blind while holding the K 7. Four players had limped in, and the small blind had called, so we were looking at six small bets.

The flop came K 10 3, and the small blind checked. This is not the sort of situation I like to get involved with. I had a hand that I would have never played had it not been in the blind. I was out of position. My kicker was weak. The pot was small. If I bet and got any action, there was a good chance I was beat. Generally, I check and fold in this kind of situation, and I decided to do so here.

Somewhat surprisingly, it was checked around. The presence of the 10 made it very unlikely that anyone else held a king, because it would have been too dangerous to give a free card to the various draws that are frequently present when two Broadway cards are on the flop. It was even unlikely, for much the same reason, that any of the last players to act had as much as a 10, since they probably should bet that. It was starting to look like my weak free hand was good.

The turn brought the 2 and the small blind checked. I had definite reason to believe I had the best hand here. In addition, since a lot of players will bluff at a pot from the blind after everyone has checked the flop, there was a good chance I might get action from a suspicious second-best hand. I bet out, fully expecting to get either zero or one caller. After all, the pot was small, my bet was one-third of the pot, and nobody had shown any strength on the somewhat dangerous flop.

Unexpectedly, an action-fest broke out. The bearded guy on my left called, the college kid to his left called, and, after a fold, the guy wearing a purple shirt raised! What was going on here?

The small blind folded, and it was up to me again. I did not mind the calls so much, but the raise really made me pause for thought. There was some chance that purple shirt had just made a set of deuces, or that he had been (incorrectly) slow-playing some form of large hand on the flop. If that was the case, I was in deep trouble, and possibly drawing dead.

On the other hand, I had seen him make a number of strange raises earlier in the session. This could be another creative offering from his somewhat bizarre decision-making apparatus, and I could easily be ahead. I also was influenced by the fact that he was slumped in his chair. Many players with really big hands sit up and look interested.

It occurred to me then that I was looking at a classical raise or fold situation. There was a bet to me (a raise, but still a single new bet to deal with), there were no intervening players, there were players to act behind me, and they were almost certainly drawing to beat me. If I decided that I likely had the best hand, I needed to protect it. If I was in trouble, I should get way from the hand now.

I decided that purple shirt was unpredictable enough for me to play my hand as the best one at this point, but subject to change later if the action dictated. That being the case, though, I had to raise. So, indeed, I three-bet, not really knowing what to expect. The bearded guy called two more big bets, the college kid folded, and purple shirt just called. That was a relief. If he had raised again, I might have had to release my hand even though the pot had grown quite large.

The river card was the 3. This seemed safe in terms of draws, anyway. But I had to decide whether to bet. It seemed clear that the bearded guy was on a draw and had missed. That left unpredictable purple shirt. I certainly did not want to face a raise, since I still had a suspect hand, in sprite of my bravado in three-betting the previous street. Plus, a check by me could possibly induce a bluff. I determined I had more to gain by checking than by betting, so I checked – and so did everyone else. I showed down my king-rag and it was good. The bearded guy showed me the Q 9, so he had a flush draw with a gutshot-straight draw, as well. Purple shirt just mucked and slumped a bit more.

I thought this was a most unusual hand. I had checked the flop, three-bet the turn, and checked the river. I do not recall ever seeing a hand like that before. Also, my assessment of the somewhat unusual raise or fold situation had been correct. I was faced with such a situation, even though it came after a raise rather than a bet, and fortunately, I made the right decision.

Conclusion: Raise or fold situations occur frequently. Almost every time someone bets and you are next to act, you should stop to consider whether you are facing such a situation. If you are, you must become willing to act decisively. I am no longer a compromising sort of person in these situations, and my results have improved considerably. Yours can improve, as well, if you act decisively.