Threehanded at the 2005 World Series of Poker

Any self-respecting poker player knows full well when the World Series of Poker has arrived. Personally, I count the days until the main event arrives. And since it's getting to be that time of the year again, I've decided to focus my next two columns on the WSOP championship event.

A very interesting hand came up last year when the main event was down to Joseph Hachem, Steve Dannenmann, and Tex Barch. I haven't seen anyone really discuss this pivotal hand, so I'd like to try to break it down a bit. I'll describe the action, and then provide my comments in italics.

Hachem was the chip leader with about $27 million. Dannenmann was not far behind with roughly $23 million, while Barch had lost some key hands and was short-stacked with $5.65 million. The blinds were $120,000-$240,000. Dannenmann had 7 7 on the button and raised to $750,000.

This was a pretty standard raise, and he certainly had a legitimate raising hand for threehanded play. In fact, it was probably a better hand than his opponents would give him credit for.

Hachem had J J in the small blind and decided just to call.

Obviously, I cannot know what Hachem planned to do after the flop, but I found his play a bit surprising for at least two reasons. First, he had to believe his jacks were the best hand preflop. And given their vulnerability, an argument could be made for trying to get more money in preflop, at a time when he can be pretty sure they are leading.

Second, pocket jacks are very difficult to play post-flop, especially from out of position. So, by allowing Dannenmann to see a flop without a reraise, he was potentially putting himself in a tough spot. He knew that Dannenmann, as the button raiser, could have had just about anything. So, if the flop came with any overcards to the jacks, it would not be easy to tell if his jacks were good, and he could potentially lose a decent chunk of his stack while finding out.

On the other hand, his play had some definite deceptive value. No one would put him on a hand as good as pocket jacks after he merely called Dannenmann's raise.

Barch had A 6 in the big blind, and decided to go all in for $4.9 million more.

Maybe Barch could have waited for a better spot, but I think his play was justified. As we said, Dannenmann could have had just about anything as the button raiser. He certainly would have raised with many hands worse than ace high. Meanwhile, Hachem's call would normally be a sign of considerable weakness, since he could have been expected to reraise Dannenmann with any strong hand. Barch needed to find a spot to pick up some chips, and this seemed like as good a spot as any. He would have added $1.5 million to his stack, which was significant considering that he had less than $6 million.

Clearly, Hachem's deceptive call led to Barch's mistake. If Hachem had reraised, Barch probably would have laid down his A 6 without much thought. Instead, Hachem's call caused Barch to believe that ace high could be the best hand, when in fact it was way behind. Did Hachem have this possibility in mind when he flat-called with his jacks? We'll never know for sure, but it certainly did the trick.

Dannenmann chose to call the extra $4.9 million with his 7 7.

Maybe his call was a little loose, but I'm sure he wanted the opportunity to get down to heads-up with Hachem, so I certainly can understand it. He probably figured that Barch most likely had overcards, and he was definitely willing to gamble in an attempt to eliminate him.

After Dannenmann called, Hachem also called the extra $4.9 million.

I find this call at least as interesting as, if not even more interesting than, Hachem's earlier call. It was pretty clear that Dannenmann did not have aces, kings, or queens. If he did, he almost certainly would have reraised Barch's all in to isolate him. So, should Hachem have reraised and put Dannenmann to the test? In retrospect, if he had, the entire tournament easily could have ended on that very hand. Dannenmann had shown a willingness to gamble, and he definitely might have taken a chance with his sevens.

The reason Hachem just called is that he wanted to allow the maximum chance of busting Barch. Not only would eliminating Barch mean a guaranteed step up of $1.75 million in real prize money, it would leave him heads up with Dannenmann, whom he might have thought he could outplay.

I think it is a legitimate question to ask, though, if Hachem should have gone for the home run with his jacks and tried to end it right there. As the chip leader, he could not have been eliminated on that hand, and if Dannenmann called his all in, Hachem would have had to lose to both players in order for one of them not to get eliminated.

The board came 10 3 2 Q 9. Hachem and Dannenmann checked it down the entire way, and Hachem won the $17 million pot with his jacks, eliminating Barch and taking a big step toward winning the title.

By checking it down, Hachem was hoping to increase the chances of eliminating Barch. The problem is that he was also increasing the chances of the $17 million pot going to Dannenmann. If moving up a spot was Hachem's primary goal, I guess checking it down made sense. It's tough to argue with the desire to lock up a guaranteed $4.25 million.

On the other hand, despite the huge amounts of real money at stake, I think a lot of players (including myself) would make the play that would give them the best shot at the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity of becoming world champion. If Hachem had been more concerned with winning the title than with moving up to second, he probably would have bet the flop, especially since the $17 million pot would have gone a long way toward that title.

As I said, pocket aces, kings, or queens were unlikely holdings for Dannenmann due to his cold-call of Barch's all in. That means that with a flop of 10 3 2, the only thing Hachem had to realistically fear was a set, but I think that is a chance he should have been willing to take. It was much more likely that Dannenmann had an A-K or A-Q type of hand, so by betting on the flop,
Hachem potentially could have chased out Dannenmann, and greatly increased his chances of winning the pot.

As it was, Dannenmann had a small pair instead of overcards, but the same argument holds true. Think about how differently we would view Hachem's decision to check it down if a 7 had hit on the turn or river. Fortunately for Hachem, Dannenmann received no improvement, so it became a moot point. But if Dannenmann had won the pot, and consequently taken the chip lead and won the title, I think this hand would have come under a lot more scrutiny. Since Hachem won the hand and then, deservedly, the title, there was not much reason to examine his play.

Nevertheless, I found this to be the most interesting hand of the 2005 final table, so I decided to share my thoughts about it with you here, and I hope you found it worthwhile. Next month, I'll have more thoughts about the main event.

Matt Lessinger is the author of The Book of Bluffs: How to Bluff and Win at Poker, now available everywhere. To find other articles of Matt's, check out the Online Poker News newsletter at http://www.cardplayer.com/.