I'm fortunate to have gained some wonderful friendships from my involvement in the poker community these last 20 years. Three of those friends are Ken, Michael, and James, all San Francisco Bay Area residents with whom I've shared many great home poker games. And much to my delight, we've also shared music concerts, sushi, and falafels. We've also attended at least one memorial service together; real friends are with you through both thick and thin.
For years, we've carried on e-mail conversations about poker hands that one or the other of us has played. Recently we had a great discussion about a limit hold'em hand that Ken had played. It was a H.O.R.S.E. game (mixed games), including stud, so it was eighthanded. Ken had the K
6
in the big blind (BB), the under-the-gun (UTG) player raised, and everyone folded to Ken.
"Defend, right?" Ken asked rhetorically in his e-mail - as he had called (or there wouldn't be a story here).
Michael liked Ken's play, and I should note that Michael plays very big limit hold'em; there are very few people whose poker judgment I trust more. But I respectfully disagree with Michael here. First, I always get nervous when players talk about "defending" their blinds. To me, "defend" is what you do with something you own (for example, civil liberties). Money you posted in a blind isn't yours; it's in the pot. When you get over-possessive about money that's not yours any more, you're headed for trouble.
Furthermore, K-6 suited is exactly the sort of hand that gets you in trouble. Remember, our raiser was under the gun in an eighthanded game. He's supposed to have a relatively narrow range of hands, and a lot of those hands dominate K-6. What, Ken, are you going to do if a king flops? You've got top pair, no kicker, and you're out of position. Welcome to poker hell. Our mutual friend Barry Tanenbaum says, "Don't call raises from the blind with 'big-little'"; this is exactly what Barry's talking about, and why.
But, Ken called, so here we are. The flop came A
9
8
, so Ken had flopped the second-nut-flush draw, with the unfortunate feature that even the A
wouldn't give him the nuts. But he decided to check-raise the flop … "I'm hoping he has Q-Q, J-J, or K-K and will just fold."
At this point, Michael disagreed with Ken's thinking, though not with the play per se: "The only thing I don't agree with is your thought that by check-raising the flop, you are going to persuade K-K, Q-Q, J-J to lay it down right there. That is crazy talk. Change that to K-Q, K-J, K-10 and I'm with you."
But Ken wanted to trade on his tight image: "I play pretty tight in the hold'em rounds of H.O.R.S.E. A player who is paying attention might fold pairs here."
But Michael was having none of it: "Then you should be crushing the game. Folding K-K, Q-Q, J-J in this spot is lighting money on fire and then using it to burn up more money."
It was at this point that James stepped in: "Interesting … for my edification, how would you define 'this spot'? Big pocket pairs when an ace flops? And if you wouldn't let go to a check-raise on the flop, when would you let go?"
I was pretty sure I knew where Michael was going, so I replied with an explanation, asking for Michael's confirmation. In short, suppose that you are an under-the-gun raiser with a big pocket pair (not aces). Only the BB calls your raise. Now, the flop comes ace high, and the BB check-raises you. You are getting 15-2 to call, with position throughout the hand.
Michael confirmed my suspicion about his thinking, and added some numbers to support his argument. I won't reproduce his analysis here, but in short, he showed that a moderately tight under-the-gun raiser would have a pair of kings or weaker on this flop 53 percent of the time. Now, note that by check-raising, the BB is risking two bets to win the 5.5 bets in the pot. So, if the BB can get the preflop raiser to fold more than 36 percent of the time, he shows a profit by check-raising every hand of this form. Since our under-the-gun raiser will not have a pair of aces (or stronger) more than half the time, he dares not fold every pocket pair when the BB check-raises him. It makes far more sense to call that check-raise and then re-evaluate things on the turn. You've told the BB that you're not giving up easily; you have position and could very well be waiting to spring a turn raise on him. If he bets again on the turn, it's fair to consider folding.
Before we go on to the rest of Ken's hand, I do want to make a caveat. Some players are tight and predictable enough that if they check-raise you from the blind on an ace-high flop, you have all but a written affidavit that Q-Q is no good. Against such players, it's safe to fold immediately on the flop. But such players are rare, particularly on the Internet. And even not very creative players will start to notice that you're folding in that situation and will give you plenty of opportunities to do it.
Returning to Ken's hand, the rest of it was not very interesting, strategically or tactically; it was just a case of bad luck. Ken's opponent reraised when Ken check-raised the flop. Ken thought, "Uh-oh," but called, as he should. The turn was the A
, making Ken's flush. He check-raised again, (reasonably) putting his opponent on a big ace. Unfortunately, the under-the-gun player reraised again. Ken called him there, and check-called on the river, which was a small, meaningless card. He was shown A-9, the absolute nuts.
As you can see, the turn and river pretty much played themselves; Ken just ran into the worst turn card he possibly could, making his flush and his opponent's full house simultaneously. The interesting bits were in the first two betting rounds.
My thanks to you for reading, and a special thanks to Ken, Michael, and James for their discussion - and even more so for their friendship. I'll see you guys at a sushi bar soon.
Lee Jones is a well-known poker author (Winning Low Limit Hold'em), analyst, and commentator. He works for the European Poker Tour.
