Getting Away From Q-Q

Deep in a $3,000 buy-in World Series of Poker tournament, with 82 players left and 72 getting paid, the following hand came up:

With the blinds at 1,000-2,000, Ted Lawson opened from under the gun for 7,000, a player called from the button, and I looked down at Q-Q in the big blind. I called fairly quickly, trying to keep my powerful hand well-disguised. Why hem and haw, and therefore reveal that I was thinking of reraising? If I did that, the power of the trap would be lost.

The flop came 8-8-8. I checked, and Lawson fired out 20,000 as fast as possible. The other player folded, and I called. I thought about raising, but why raise Lawson off a small pair like 6-6, in which case he was drawing almost completely dead? My trap was working to perfection!

The turn was a jack. I checked, and Lawson quickly announced, “I’m all in.” I counted my remaining chips (74,000), and then I went into the tank. Why was Lawson betting it all? Did he have pocket aces or pocket kings? Did he have pocket jacks? I didn’t mind being eliminated out of the money, but any cash that I made would add to my WSOP record number of cashes (80 now).

Why in the world was Lawson betting so quickly? After a minute passed, I started to talk to Lawson. I said, “You wouldn’t believe how powerful I am. I hope that you have pocket tens, and then you’re just as dead as a doorknob here!” This subtly suggested to Lawson how powerful I was without violating any rules. I wanted to see his reaction when he suspected that I was powerful: Was it fear, or was he calm? I thought he was calm.
Finally, I flipped my hand faceup and folded it. By now, a ton of people (and press) had gathered around the table to watch this hand unfold, and when I folded my hand, you could see a lot of confusion on people’s faces. Lawson then showed pocket aces. I felt like a genius! I believe that I could count on one hand the number of players in the world who would have folded my pocket queens in that spot, but I’ll stop bragging now. Let’s take a closer look at this hand.

Lawson’s 7,000 opening bet was a little high by today’s standard (which is about 2.5 times the big blind), but it fits right into the historical standard of 3.5 times the big blind. My call from the big blind was very tricky, and not the right move for most of the world. I would recommend to my students and friends that they reraise about 15,000 more. Considering that Lawson had aces, my move was spot on.

I like my check on the flop, which continues my trapping line of play. I also like Lawson’s 20,000 bet on the flop, because sometimes, betting a powerful hand (the second-best hand out there, in this case) works. However, I also like a check here. Why not check? In most cases, your opponents are basically drawing dead, unless they have a pocket pair of nines or higher, which is not very likely. Perhaps the third player in the hand had a small pair and would have bet it, or perhaps the third player had a jack, and would have hit it on the turn and paid off Lawson’s aces. I like my 20,000 call, but I would advise most players to go ahead and raise right here and right now — thus springing the trap! The minute that you call 20,000, your opponent knows that you are strong anyway, and he is likely to stop bluffing you; thus, you are simply giving him a free shot at hitting an ace or a king. So, go ahead and move all in here, unless your sixth sense is going crazy!

Lawson’s bet on the turn was OK, but I would prefer to see him do two things: First, bet a lot less, like 20,000. (I would have had to call that amount.) What are you risking by betting less? I mean, I may have two outs to win, and perhaps zero. Second, he should have taken his time. Betting extremely fast is tricky, I’ll give him that much, but when he bet that fast, it was a sign of strength to me.

Learn more about Phil by going to his website, www.PhilHellmuth.com, and visit his webstore at www.PokerBrat.com.