Pulling and Pushing

I had about two hours to kill before leaving for the airport, so I bought in to a semiloose $10-$20 Omaha eight-or-better game with a half-kill. After the first hour, I didn't want to leave, as I had 10 stacks of red chips in a bowling-pin pyramid. After the second hour, I had added five more stacks for the back row. And throughout those two hours, I never won a really big pot! But there were a few fine points that came up in handling the small pots.

In the big blind, I picked up a nice little wrap with the 3 5 4 6. I had a tight image and the preflop raiser was a bull. The button cold-called, possibly on momentum, as he and the bull had been in the previous few pots together. I chose to call.

The flop came 10-6-4 rainbow, including a club and a diamond. I liked the flop enough to bet it, but that would be wrong in this scenario. I checked to the bull, because with two low cards in the flop, he was extremely likely to bet, and did. The button, with some anguish, made one of his rare post-flop folds. So, according to plan, I simply called.

A 7 hit on the turn. I now had a low-end straight (both a 9-8 and 8-5 would make a higher straight than mine). I checked to the bull and he bet, as expected. What would you do now?

The only hands that beat me both ways were a 9-8 with an A-2 or A-3, or an 8-5 with an ace. Since he was quite unlikely to have me beat both ways, I thought I would try a "test raise." Even if he happened to have one of the hands that beat me both ways, I still had lots of "salvage" river cards. I could make a full house or flush to win high, or his low could get counterfeited if the last card was an ace or deuce.

But if you would have raised, as I did, you also missed the point of this hand. Since I was successfully "pulling" him in, very similar to pulling a preflop raiser in hold'em, I simply should have kept on pulling – unless I had some reason to change horses and "push." In retrospect, I don't like my raise, since it was likely that he had a better low than mine for half the pot. My raise really didn't accomplish anything, and in the rare case when he had me beat both ways, it might cost a lot.

He looked at my raise, then looked at me, and said, "I give it to you." He then folded. It was only then that I realized I had just made a stupid raise. I knew from the start that he might be aggressive with very little, as usual, and I had been routinely pulling. If I had simply called rather than raise for no good reason, I might have gotten him for another bet on the river, and without taking the unnecessary extra risk that I had taken.

On the next hand, I watched as a nonparticipant as the bull again raised before the flop, bet every time it was his turn, and then lucked into half of a good-sized pot. Then, on the next hand, from the button I crawled into unraised six-way action with A 4 5 9.

The flop came 9-5-2 and the 9 was a heart. Both blinds and the third hand checked around to the bull, who bet. The bull's usual opponent (who had been involved in the earlier hand), sitting once removed to my right, called.

Since neither of these two players had raised before the flop, I believed I could go to the bank that neither of them had an A-3. Note how that inference strongly affected my play throughout the hand. Of the three other players on my left, two were blinds. Since I had the second-nut low draw and two-pair, I raised to pressure the two blinds and the other player to my left. My nines and fives would have much better chances for high in three-way action than in six-way action.

And note that one of the potential benefits of my raise was to see if the third player who had voluntarily called before the flop could call this raise. If he did call the raise, that would make it more likely there was an A-3 lurking. And that would have a strong impact on how I would proceed during the next two double-bet rounds.

However, all three players on my left folded to my raise, and the bull and other player just called. The turn card was a queen and they both checked to me. The queen was less than helpful, but I detected weakness, so I bet anyway. They both called.

The river card was an 8, which at least made my low. They both checked. Since I was convinced that I had the best low, I bet again. They both called with bad lows and even worse highs! So, I won both ways with those rather unimpressive cards.

Although we all like to win the big pots, there is often more skill involved in maximizing our wins and minimizing our losses in the small pots, and they can really add up.