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Four Bets Without the Nuts?

by Matt Lessinger |  Published: Nov 21, 2003

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You will hardly ever see two players put in four bets each on the river with neither one of them holding the nuts. It's even rarer when both are making the correct play based on the information available to them. Obviously, this was an unusual hand. I was able to talk to Ernesto (not his real name), one of the players involved, to get his perspective on the way the hand played out. Incidentally, Ernesto is a very solid player, and he will rarely make an action without a good reason for it.

Ernesto found himself under the gun (UTG) with 8-8 and called preflop. His logic: The game was loose-passive, so calling was the only option that made sense. Four other players called, the blinds called, and they saw the flop sevenhanded (certainly confirming Ernesto's observation that the game was loose-passive!). The flop came A-8-2 rainbow. Ernesto checked, hoping to check-raise. His logic: With seven players out there, I figured the chances were good that someone had an ace. Plus, the board wasn't scary, so even if no one had an ace, I wasn't too worried about giving a free card. Alas, everyone checked the flop. With the knowledge that the game was loose-passive, a bet might have been the preferable play, but anyone with an ace probably would have bet. So, now Ernesto knew his opponents' hands were clearly weak.

The turn was a 5, and Ernesto bet out. His logic: There was no point in going for a check-raise this time, since the 5 probably did not help anyone. No one was going to give me credit for that strong a hand anyway, so I was hoping to get called by something as weak as a pair of deuces or fives. And then, of course, there was a possible straight draw out there, so anyone who decided to call with a 3 or a 4 in his hand was getting a terrible price on his draw. Three players decided to call.

The river was a queen, for a final board of A-8-2-5-Q. Ernesto bet, one player called, and then the button raised. Ernesto decided to three-bet it. His logic: The most likely hand for the button to have in that spot was queens up. If he had a straight, I would have heard from him on the turn, so I've got to figure I have the best hand. If I thought the player between us would call two bets, maybe I would just call. But once that player saw the button raise, he was visibly set to throw his cards away, so I wasn't going to get an overcall. It was better to raise and get another bet from the button.

The middle man folded, as expected, but then the button made it four bets. Ernesto called and was clearly surprised (as was most of the table) when the button turned up Q-Q to take the pot. Ernesto's reaction: It was really tough to put him on that hand. He didn't raise preflop from the button, and he also didn't bet on the flop when everyone checked to him. That's probably one of the only times I'll ever put in four bets on the river with the worst hand. Ernesto may have spent four bets on the river, and nobody feels good when that happens, but I don't think he has any reason to feel bad. His logic was sound, and I don't know a player in the world who could have put the button on Q-Q.

I have to agree that if I were the player with Q-Q, I would have played it differently. I certainly would have raised before the flop. On the flop, I wouldn't necessarily have bet, for fear of the ace. But, if I'm prepared to call a bet on the turn when a blank comes, I'm better off betting on the flop and taking the initiative. When the queen falls on the river, three queens is clearly not the nuts, but making it four bets has to be the correct play. With a board of A-8-2-5-Q, the only hands that can beat a set of queens are 4-3 and A-A. Meanwhile, it's a safe assumption that a solid player like Ernesto wouldn't call with 4-3 from UTG, and it's unlikely that he would limp in with A-A, either, so knowing your opponent helps you gain an extra bet. Against a more unorthodox opponent, you might have to proceed more cautiously with the set of queens, and perhaps only call the third bet.

If there's a lesson to be learned from this hand, I think it relates to that idea of being an unorthodox player as opposed to a straightforward one. Many good players will tell you they are always careful to make the "correct play." Yet, what they often fail to realize is that, depending on who your opponents are, sometimes the correct play is not what would normally be considered "correct"! If your opponent is knowledgeable and knows that you are a solid player, sometimes your proper move is to do something completely out of character! Otherwise, you become predictable, and once that happens, you lose a major component of your poker arsenal.

In this hand, notice how things worked out for the button because of the unorthodox way he played his queens. I'm not defending his play, but merely pointing out that he was able to get four bets out of a very solid player strictly because he played his hand in an unexpected manner. That is why many poker authors will tell you that you should raise preflop with not only big pairs and big cards, but occasionally with hands like 9-8 and 6-5 suited, to add a little element of surprise to your game. When you make that preflop raise with 6-5 and the flop comes 6-6-2, and you see the utter look of surprise on your opponents' faces at the showdown, you'll see why the play was worth it. Not only will you (probably) win that pot, but it should be a big one since no one will put you on trips. And even more importantly, no one at that table will ever forget that you raised that one time with 6-5. Every time you raise in the future, they will wonder if you could possibly be raising with 6-5 again.

In Ernesto's case, every time this particular opponent limps in preflop, Ernesto will have to consider the possibility that the man is limping in with a big pocket pair – which essentially means that he could be limping in with anything. I think we all wish we could be considered that unpredictable.diamonds