Final-Table Takedown -- Vanessa Selbst

Vanessa Selbst, 25, is a graduate of Yale University. Apart from playing poker for a living, she currently attends Yale Law School, where she is finishing her second year. She also works as an executive producer at DeucesCracked, giving private poker lessons and making instructional videos. Selbst plays in live high-stakes cash games, and has made five final tables at the World Series of Poker and cashed for more than $1,600,000 in tournament play.

Event: 2010 North American Poker Tour Mohegan Sun main event
Players in the Event: 716
Buy-in: $5,000
First Prize: $750,000
Finish: First

Hand No. 1
Key Concepts: Reading hand ranges based on player tendencies

Alan Sternberg raises to 95,000 from the cutoff.

Craig Tapscott: What do you know about this opponent?

Vanessa Selbst: I don’t know much about him, except that he had amassed a very large stack of chips at the other table, which typically means that he was playing a lot of hands. So far at this table, he’s played a good number, as well, and has never failed to fire multiple barrels. He has been to showdown twice, once as a bluff and once with a monster. Basically, he reminds me a lot of me before I became a more disciplined player (that is, not firing on every street). So, this is my read, for good or bad, after not very long at the table with him. Also, he has raised about 70 percent of cutoffs when it has been folded to him.

Selbst reraises to 280,000 with the A 5 from the small blind.

VS: I have been three-betting a good number of pots when I have thought people are opening light. Anyway, I stick out the 280,000, and Alan looks upset; then within three seconds, he announces, “I’m all in.”

Sternberg moves all in for 1,601,000.

CT: Would he shove with a big hand in this spot?

VS: With a very big hand, I think he’s much more likely to four-bet small, to induce me to shove. So, I heavily discounted big pairs and A-K. I did think he might shove a hand like a small or medium pocket pair, or A-Q to A-10, or something, but I thought he would take a lot longer to do that.

CT: Why is that?

VS: First, you have to work up the nerve, but besides that, calling with those stacks in position was a very viable option for those hands, and I think he’d need to take the time to think about whether or not calling was better than shoving. So, based on that, I really thought he was bluffing.

CT: Did any other factors figure into your read?

VS: I did say that he reminded me of me a couple of years ago, so I figured that he held some suited connectors and didn’t want me to five-bet shove on him light, since he knew I was capable of it. Also, I think his thought process went something like, “Well, if she does have A-K or something, my suited connectors are very live.” Plus, A-5 suited is pretty.

Selbst calls. Sternberg reveals the 6 5.

Flop: Q 9 5 (pot: 3,456,000)
Turn: 7 (pot: 3,456,000)
River: 10 (pot: 3,456,000)

Selbst wins the pot of 3,456,000 and eliminates Sternberg.

Hand No. 2
Key Concepts: Hand reading; positive expected value; deciphering hand equity

Mike Beasley limps in from the button.

CT: Could he have a monster? Has he limped in from the button previously?

VS: The limp is something he had not done yet. From my limited experience in seeing people limp in from the button when three-handed, rarely, if ever, is it with a monster. I mean, there’s no reason to limp in with a monster when first in if you’ve been raising, because you’re actually more likely to get played back at by continuing to raise.

Mike Woods calls. Selbst checks her option with the Q 6.

Flop: K 3 3 (pot: 330,000)
Woods checks. Selbst checks.

VS: I check, knowing that on this type of board, Beasley is very likely to take a stab with whatever 10-high type of hand he limped in with.

Beasley bets 200,000. Woods folds. Selbst raises to 550,000.

CT: Why that bet-sizing? It looks kind of small.

VS: I didn’t make a huge raise because I wanted to represent strength, as I could very easily have a 3, since I checked the big blind.

Beasley reraises to 1,200,000.

CT: Do you believe that he has the 3 now?

VS: At this point, it’s possible that he has a 3 and plays it this way, but I don’t think there are that many threes in his limping range; A-3, Q-3 suited, 4-3 suited, and so on, but it’s definitely a small part of that range.

CT: A king?

VS: I do not think he would play a king like this unless it was a very big king, like A-K or K-Q, and once again, I didn’t think he was limping with those hands preflop right now. With any other king, it’s better for him just to call and let me bluff, since reraising would often make all worse hands fold, especially bluffs, which should make up a decent part of my range on this board. Let’s say that he has something like K-6; then, he beats only a bluff, since he loses to a 3 and most kings, so if he is going to continue, it should be by calling and letting me bluff. He was good enough to realize all of this, so I didn’t think he had a king.

CT: So, what’s he up to?

VS: Given that he knows the board is one that neither of us hits that often, and I have been check-raising and raising at every opportunity, I thought there was a good chance that he was just playing back at me.

CT: With that read, can you profitably shove?

VS: Well, if I go all in and lose, I’ll be down to about 7,000,000, and instead of having a commanding chip lead, I’ll actually find myself in second place. I really didn’t want that to happen, but at the same time, there was about 2,000,000 in the pot, and I thought he would fold his hand a large percentage of the time. Basically, I had to risk about 2,800,000 to win 2,000,000, and I thought he would fold about three-fourths of the time, making the shove itself a +EV [positive expected value] play, without counting my equity if called. When you add to that the fact that when called (usually by a 3), I still have around 25 percent equity to win, it then becomes a no-brainer. So, in the end, it was a very easy shove for me.

Selbst moves all in. Beasley folds. Selbst wins the pot of 2,080,000.