Failing to Adjust - Failing to adjust your play to your opponents can spell doom

I get a strange pleasure from recounting hands that I played terribly. Of course I am not happy about them, but I think talking about them helps me avoid similar disasters in the future. In turn, I hope that telling you about one here will help you avoid the same mistakes I made.

We all know that the correct play in a given situation depends on many factors, especially the type of opponents you are facing. In this hand, I thought I was adjusting properly to my opponents. But, in retrospect, I should have adjusted much better. My thoughts are in italics.

The Scenario

I was in the No. 8 seat in a $20-$40 hold'em game. I had never played with the player in the No. 2 seat before, but soon realized that he was a predictable maniac (PM). He raised before almost every flop. Every time someone checked to him, he bet. When someone bet into him, he usually raised. It was clear that most of my other opponents were waiting for a strong hand to try to isolate and punish him.

Admittedly, patience has never been one of my virtues, and I wasn't waiting around like the rest of my opponents. I was much more willing to give the PM some action in return for the action he was producing. Unbelievably, within two hours I found myself having to call him on the river four times with nothing but an unimproved ace high. Twice, my ace high was the best hand. I was showing an overall profit, and I had no intention of avoiding confrontations with him.

The Hand

Predictably, the PM open-raised. Everyone folded to me in the small blind, and I looked down to find the A 8. I chose to flat-call, and Marco called behind me, so we went to the flop threehanded. My thoughts: Three-betting was probably a better option, since the A 8 certainly figured to be the best hand. But, I had taken ace high against the PM so many times that I thought I might have been pushing my luck. Plus, being out of position, I figured I would see if the flop was favorable before investing a significant amount of money. Of course, the main result was that Marco had to call only one bet, and I probably would have been better off chasing him out and getting heads up with the PM. However, I also realized that Marco did not yet know how wild the PM was, and he was probably giving him credit for a real hand.

The flop came 9 8 5. We checked to the PM, and, naturally, he bet. I check-raised with middle pair, top kicker. Marco turned and looked at me with a disgusted look on his face, and then called the double bet. The PM three-bet, and Marco and I both called. My thoughts: Marco's look conveyed a lot. It was as if he said, "I know you're check-raising just to try to get me out, but I have a hand here, too. But, I'd rather not have to call two bets with it." From that look, I figured he was most likely on a draw, but once he called the double bet, it seemed that he had made up his mind to go the distance with it. If I had a stronger hand, I would have capped the betting after the PM's three-bet. But, I was not entirely confident that I had the best hand. Even blind squirrels find nuts, and there was always the chance that the PM had me beat. Therefore, I decided to take my foot off the accelerator and see what happened next.

The turn was the 3. We checked to the PM, he bet, and we both called. My thoughts: If I thought a check-raise could move Marco off his hand, I would have done it. But his manner conveyed a determination to see the hand to the river, especially now that the pot was getting big. Plus, I had the nagging feeling that this might be the one time the PM woke up with a real hand. Thus, I chose to flat-call.

The river was the 10, for a final board of 9 8 5 3 10. I checked, and Marco checked, while looking genuinely unhappy. The PM bet, and I called. My thoughts: As soon as I called, I cursed myself for making the worst possible decision. I had put Marco on a draw; therefore, the 10 must have helped him. Either he made a flush or a straight or, if he had a straight draw such as J-10, he made top pair. If he did not have a drawing hand, he must have had at least a pair of nines, or else he would not have called my double bet after the flop. One way or another, he must have had me beat. With that knowledge, I could have folded, but that would not have been my strongest play.

After I called, Marco deliberated for some time, looking pained about his decision. Finally, he threw in the $40 call, at which point I knew I had no chance. The PM showed 6-5 offsuit for a pair of fives. I showed my pair of eights, and Marco turned over the 10 7 for the winning pair of tens.

I failed to three-bet preflop, and I failed to check-raise on the river. If I had avoided either of those mistakes, I would have won the pot. Of course, both of those plays were extremely situational. If you were an outsider looking at just my hand strength, it would seem overly aggressive to three-bet preflop with the A 8from the small blind against an early-position raiser. And it definitely would seem a little strange to check-raise on the river with third pair when there were obvious straight and flush possibilities. But, to adjust properly to my competition, I should have made those plays. When I found that I had spent $180 without giving myself the best chance to win the pot, it was a very unpleasant thought.

If you'd like to avoid encountering that feeling yourself, you won't fail to adjust to your opponents the same way that I did.

Matt Lessinger is the author of the forthcoming The Book of Bluffs (How to Bluff and Win at Poker). You can find more of his articles in the Online Poker News, at www.cardplayer.com.